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Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in
Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”
A REPLY TO MR. KRY
Thomas Y. Davies†
[The] process by which old principles and old phrases are charged
with a new content, is from the lawyer’s point of view an evolution of
the true intent and meaning of the old law; from the historian’s point
of view it is almost of necessity a process of perversion and
misunderstanding.
—Frederic Maitland††

I.

INTRODUCTION

Originalists attribute heightened normative importance
to the original meaning of a constitutional provision. Given
that position, should they be expected to exercise discipline in
making claims about the historical content of the original
meaning? Should they refrain from making originalist claims
in the absence of clear historical evidence of the Framers’
understanding? If so, what are the criteria for identifying valid
historical evidence of the Framers’ design?
These issues are at the root of a controversy regarding
one of the two originalist claims that appeared in Justice
Scalia’s 2004 opinion for the Court in Crawford v. Washington.1
In a 2005 article in this Law Review, I criticized the historical
claims in Crawford as yet another example of fictional
originalism in Supreme Court opinions.2 Mr. Robert Kry, who
clerked for Justice Scalia during the term in which Crawford
†

E.E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law and Alumni Distinguished
Service Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
††
Frederic Maitland, Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge (1888), quoted in 3
PETER GAY & VICTORIA G. WEXLER, HISTORIANS AT WORK 301-02 (1975).
Quotations of historical sources are presented in this article with the
original spelling, capitalization, and punctuation, but in modern typeface.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know
It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
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was decided, now responds that my criticisms of one of
Crawford’s originalist claims were unfounded.3 I reply to Mr.
Kry in this article.
A.

Justice Scalia’s Originalist Claims in Crawford

The subject in dispute is a facet of the original meaning
of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in the Bill of
Rights. There is no doubt that the Framers intended for that
Clause to require that evidence in criminal trials usually be
presented by live witnesses, in the presence of the defendant,
and subject to cross-examination by the defendant in the view
of the jury.
However, the scope and content of the
confrontation right has seemed problematic with regard to the
admission of hearsay evidence—a witness’s repetition at trial
of an out-of-court statement made by a declarant who does not
testify at the trial.
Because admitting out-of-court statements made by a
person who does not testify at trial contravenes the face-to-face
and cross-examination aspects of the defendant’s confrontation
right, it seems apparent that such statements should not be
admissible if the out-of-court declarant is available to be
produced as a prosecution witness at trial. In fact, the use of
out-of-court statements of persons who could have testified in
person is the specific abuse associated with the creation of the
confrontation right.4 However, the admissibility of out-of-court
3
Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Response to
Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493, 494 (2007). Kry notes that his focus on this
aspect should not be viewed as “acquiescence” in other aspects of my criticism of
Crawford. Id. at 556 n.291.
4
For example, the admission of out-of-court statements by a person who was
available to be called as a witness was one of the notorious defects in Sir Walter
Raleigh’s 1603 trial. See Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603). That defect was noted
in legal authorities widely used by the Framers, such as Sergeant William Hawkins’s
leading treatise on criminal law and procedure, which also stated that it was
subsequently adjudged that out-of-court depositions of persons who might have been
produced as witnesses at trial could not be admitted into evidence. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 430 (5th ed. 1771).
Volume one of Hawkins’s treatise was initially published in 1716; volume 2
in 1721. Several subsequent editions that were virtually identical to the first edition
were published in 1724-1726, 1739, and 1771. For simplicity, I cite to the 1771 edition.
For bibliographic information, see 1 A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 362-63 (W. Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell eds., 2d
ed. 1955) [hereinafter MAXWELL].
Thomas Leach edited two further editions of Hawkins’s treatise in which
he made substantial additions. He published an edition in 1787 in which he added
substantial notes and sometimes textual material to Hawkins’s original work. Most of
the surviving copies of that edition in American libraries are of a 1788 Dublin
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statements made by a genuinely unavailable declarant (for
example, a declarant who has died prior to the trial) poses a
more difficult issue, because such statements may involve
important evidence, or even the most pertinent evidence, that
could not be presented in any other way. How should the
confrontation right now be understood with regard to the
admissibility of out-of-court statements?
In Crawford, Justice Scalia asserted that originalism
could answer that question and made two related claims about
“the Framers’ design” for the application of the Confrontation
Clause to such hearsay statements.5 First, he asserted that the
Framers’ concern was “focused” on “testimonial” out-of-court
statements6—that is, statements comparable to formal witness
examinations taken by justices of the peace during the
eighteenth century. On that basis, he strongly suggested that
the confrontation right should apply only to “testimonial” outof-court statements, but not to more casual or “nontestimonial”
sorts of hearsay statements.7 In other words, the Confrontation
Clause would not bar the admission of “nontestimonial” out-ofcourt statements even when the declarant was readily
available to be produced by the prosecution as a trial witness,
and even when the out-of-court statements provided crucial
evidence for the defendant’s conviction. (Crawford left defining
the boundary between the “testimonial” and “nontestimonial”
categories “for another day,”8 but the distinction it suggested
has since become law in the 2006 decision Davis v.
Washington.9)
reprinting, so that edition was only becoming available in America in 1789.
Additionally, Leach also published a four-volume enlarged edition in 1795 in which he
added considerable new material. To differentiate Leach’s work from Hawkins’s
original work, I cite Leach’s 1787 and 1795 editions as LEACH’S HAWKINS.
5
541 U.S. at 68.
6
Id. at 50-53.
7
Id. at 60-61.
8
Id. at 68.
9
547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). Davis and the companion decision in
Hammon v. Indiana provided some indications of the testimonial/nontestimonial
boundary, but still stopped short of offering a broad definition of the boundary. See
Materials distributed at Brooklyn Law School Symposium, Crawford and Beyond
Revisited in Dialogue (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Symposium]. In Hammon, the
Court concluded that statements made to police officers by a victim of a domestic
assault after the assault ended were testimonial and subject to the confrontation right
because the statements were primarily for the purpose of preparing for a prosecution.
Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. Conversely, in Davis, the Court found that
statements made to a 911 operator during a domestic assault were nontestimonial and
not subject to the confrontation right because they were not made primarily for the
purpose of preparing a prosecution. Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-78.
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Second, with regard to “testimonial” out-of-court
statements, to which the confrontation right would apply,
Justice Scalia asserted that the Framers understood that the
confrontation right would be violated by the admission of such
a statement in a criminal trial unless (1) the declarant was
genuinely unavailable to testify, and (2) the defendant had a
previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.10 Justice
Scalia dubbed this latter requirement the “cross-examination
rule,”11 and asserted that this rule was part of the original
understanding of the Confrontation Clause.12 Specifically,
Justice Scalia asserted that the cross-examination rule
regulated the admissibility in criminal trials of witness
examinations taken pursuant to the Marian post-arrest
procedure that applied in all felony prosecutions in eighteenthcentury England and America.13

10

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54.
Id. at 46.
12
Id. at 53-56.
13
The Marian statutes, enacted in the mid-sixteenth century, provided the
procedure for initiating felony prosecutions. See 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. 1554, c. 13, § IV; 2
& 3 Phil. & Mar. 1555, c. 10, § II. The provisions of the statutes applied when a person
was arrested for a felony or manslaughter. They required the justice of the peace to
whom the “prisoner” (that is, the arrestee) was taken to take the sworn “information”
of the witnesses who made the arrest and brought the prisoner, as well as the unsworn
“examination” of the arrestee himself, to reduce those statements to writing, and to
certify those written records to the next session of the felony trial court (either the
court of “gaol-delivery” or “sessions of the peace,” depending on the specific felony).
The Marian statutes also required coroners to take the sworn information of homicide
witnesses and certify it to the trial court. For a more detailed discussion, see Davies,
supra note 2, at 126-30.
I realize that the reader, who will almost certainly be aware that we no
longer use Marian examination procedure—and who will possibly never have heard of
any such procedure prior to encountering Crawford—may think that an argument
about Marian committal procedure is a rather arcane basis on which to construe the
Confrontation Clause today. I think that, too. See Davies, supra note 2, at 189.
However, this is the kind of historical inquiry to which originalism leads.
More accurately, this is the kind of inquiry that originalism may pose.
Often there is a preliminary question of exactly what aspects of framing-era law are
deemed pertinent. In Crawford, Justice Scalia directed attention to what he termed a
common-law “cross-examination rule” and to the “statutory derogation” posed by the
use of Marian witness examinations. See supra text accompanying note 11. However,
as I pointed out in my previous article, the Framers would have had no difficulty
deciding the outcome of the actual issue in Crawford on a much narrower ground. The
statement at issue in Crawford was a wife’s statement that tended to incriminate her
husband; however, framing-era sources stated a clear rule that a wife’s examination
could not be used against her husband as evidence. See Davies, supra note 2, at 110
n.18. Hence, Crawford purported to provide an originalist construction of the
Confrontation Clause by disregarding the fact that the Framers would have decided
the question on an entirely different ground.
11
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My Criticisms of Crawford

In a 2005 article in this Law Review, I argued that the
two originalist claims that Justice Scalia made in Crawford
both rested on misconceptions of the evidence regime that
shaped the Framers’ expectations about the confrontation right
in 1789. Specifically, I argued that he interpreted the original
scope of the right too narrowly, but also overstated one aspect
of the substance of the right.
With regard to the original scope of the confrontation
right, I argued that there was no historical basis for the
restriction of the confrontation right to only “testimonial”
hearsay, but not “nontestimonial” hearsay. Because an oath
was still a necessary requisite for admissible evidence in a
criminal trial under framing-era law,14 and “hearsay” was then
defined as any out-of-court statement not made under oath, the
rule was still that “[h]earsay is no evidence.”15 Thus, because
14
In Crawford, Justice Scalia asserted that unsworn statements obtained by
police interrogations would be “testimonial” because police interrogations bore a
“striking resemblance” to Marian witness examinations taken by justices of the peace.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. He dismissed the significance of the fact that Marian
examinations were taken under oath, but that the modern police interrogation at issue
in Crawford did not involve an oath. See id. at 52-53. However, that departed from the
framing-era understanding of valid evidence. See Davies, supra note 2, at 202-03
(noting that the police testimony regarding an out-of-court statement in Crawford
would have been inadmissible in 1789 for lack of an oath).
Justice Scalia’s dismissal of the historical oath requirement was especially
noteworthy because the importance of the oath as a condition for admissible evidence
was emphatically stated in two English cases cited in Crawford. In King v. Woodcock,
Leach (1st ed. 1789) 437, 440 (Old Bailey 1789), the 1789 case that Justice Scalia cited
as evidence of a “cross-examination rule,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46, 54 n.5, the trial
judge ruled that the out-of-court statement at issue “cannot be admitted before a Jury
as evidence; for no evidence can be legal unless it be given upon oath, judicially taken.”
In addition, in King v. Brasier, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1814) 199, 168 Eng. Rep.
202 (Twelve Judges 1779), cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-70 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring), the Twelve Judges stated that “no testimony whatsoever can be legally
received [in a felony trial] except upon oath.” Id. at 200, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202. The
description of the evidence admitted in the trial in the report of Brasier cited in
Crawford differed significantly from that which appeared in the initial version
published in 1789, but there was no change in the statement of the Twelve Judges. See
Brasier, Leach (1st ed. 1789), at 346.
Indeed, peace officers were not permitted to conduct interrogations of
arrestees during the framing-era. Police interrogation arose during the nineteenth
century after the standard for warrantless arrests was reduced to “probable cause.”
See Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial” Right in Chavez
v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1030-33 (2003) [hereinafter Davies, SelfIncrimination].
15
See, e.g., GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107 (1st ed. 1754) (“a
mere Hearsay is no evidence”); id. at 149-50 (4th ed. 1777) (same). For bibliographic
information, see Davies, supra note 2, at 143 n.123. Under modern evidence doctrine,
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there was no distinction of hearsay into categories, I argued
that Justice Scalia’s claim that the original confrontation right
was limited to only “testimonial” out-of-court statements was
merely a political choice posing as history.16 Crawford’s
categorization
of
some
out-of-court
statements
as
“nontestimonial” permits the admission of unsworn hearsay
statements that would have been inadmissible under framingera law.
I criticize the originalist claims made in Crawford and
Davis about the “testimonial” scope of the confrontation right
in more detail in a forthcoming article.17 However, because
Mr. Kry does not address this aspect of my 2005 article,18 I do
not discuss Crawford’s restriction of the scope of the
confrontation right in this article, even though it seems likely
that the limitation of the confrontation right to only
“testimonial” hearsay will prove to be the more significant
dimension of Crawford’s originalist scheme.19
of course, an out-of-court statement is not hearsay unless the statement is offered in
evidence for the truth of the content of the statement. However, that reflects a postframing alteration of the definition of hearsay that does not appear in framing-era
sources. Rather, framing-era evidence law treated all unsworn out-of-court statements
as “hearsay” and, thus, as “no evidence.” See GILBERT, supra, at 107-08 (1754 ed.); id.
at 149-50 (1777 ed.).
16
Davies, supra note 2, at 189-206. The potential implications of limiting the
confrontation right to “testimonial” hearsay statements is discussed infra note 46.
17
I further develop my criticisms of this aspect of Crawford in a follow-up
article, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay
Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Davies,
Not the Framers’ Design]. This article further develops my presentation in Symposium,
supra note 9, at 85-109, titled Originalist Alchemy: Applying the Crawford-Davis
Testimonial/Nontestimonial Distinction Despite the Framing-Era General Ban Against
Hearsay Evidence.
18
Kry states that he does not acquiesce in my criticisms of Crawford’s
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction but does not address it because it has been well
addressed by other authors, and cites Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998). See Kry, supra note 3, at 556 n.291.
However, Friedman’s article merely mentions some of the very early history of the
confrontation right, but makes no attempt to address either the right or the conception
of hearsay at the time of the framing of the Confrontation Clause. See Friedman,
supra, at 1022-25 (discussing the confrontation right to the middle of the seventeenth
century).
19
The significance of the cross-examination rule announced in Crawford will
depend upon how broadly or narrowly the justices define the concept of “testimonial”
out-of-court statements. The 2006 decision in Davis leaves open the possibility that
only statements made to government agents can be “testimonial,” but that not all such
statements will be “testimonial.” Indeed, Justice Scalia stated in Davis that whether a
statement is “testimonial” will depend upon its “primary” purpose and that “initial
inquiries” made by police will “often” be nontestimonial and thus not subject to the
confrontation right. See Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2279. Hence, although
the Crawford opinion itself may convey the impression of a robust confrontation right,
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In my 2005 article, I also criticized Justice Scalia’s
originalist claim regarding a Marian cross-examination rule.
Based on my prior research regarding the Framers’
understanding of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill
of Rights,20 it was apparent to me when I read Crawford that
Justice Scalia’s opinion did not reflect sufficient discipline
regarding the historical materials that he offered as evidence
that a cross-examination rule was part of the original
Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia had cited reports of two
1696 English proceedings and three English cases decided in
1787, 1789, and 1791.21 On the basis of those sources, Justice
Scalia claimed that at the time the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause was ratified in 1791, it was settled law
that the written record of a Marian examination of a witness
who had become genuinely unavailable to testify prior to the
trial could not be admitted as evidence in a felony trial unless
the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness when the examination was taken.
Additionally,
Justice
Scalia
asserted
that
post-framing
English
commentaries and cases and post-framing American state
cases also demonstrated that the cross-examination rule
announced in Crawford had been part of the original meaning
of the Confrontation Clause.22
However, I was aware that the 1787, 1789, and 1791
English cases that Justice Scalia had cited as evidence of a
it will not be surprising if future rulings circumscribe “testimonial” statements so
narrowly that the confrontation right and its cross-examination rule rarely apply. See
infra note 46.
20
To date, I have researched original meaning and criticized erroneous
Supreme Court “originalist” claims regarding the Fourth Amendment, Thomas Y.
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999)
[hereinafter Davies, Fourth Amendment], the law of warrantless arrest, Thomas Y.
Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the
Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) [hereinafter Davies, Arrest], and the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, Davies, Self-Incrimination,
supra note 14, at 1023-28.
21
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-47, 54 n.5 (citing Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr.
537 (H.C. 1696); King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696); King v.
Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 (Old Bailey and Twelve
Judges 1787); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (Old
Bailey 1789); King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey 1791)).
22
Id. at 47, 49-50. Justice Scalia also cited some colonial and framing-era
statements by Americans, but they only endorsed the confrontation right in general
terms, but did not actually address the specific issue of the admissibility of Marian
witness examinations. See id. at 47-49. One of those statements was altered by
editing and does not appear to have addressed confrontation in criminal cases. See
infra note 81.
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settled cross-examination rule had all been published in
London too late to have come to the Framers’ attention when
the Confrontation Clause was framed in mid-1789.23 (As I
explain below, further research has uncovered additional
objections to the 1787 and 1791 cases: the initial version of the
1787 case differed significantly from the later version cited in
Crawford;24 and the 1791 case was not published until 1800.25)
My previous research also led me to doubt that the
Framers were familiar with the details of the seventeenthcentury English treason trials that Justice Scalia discussed.
Additionally, that research convinced me that post-framing
sources could not be assumed to be trustworthy guides to the
original meaning. With regard to the latter, the reality is that
judges, abetted by commentators, have altered legal doctrine
more drastically over the two centuries since the framing of the
Bill of Rights than is commonly recognized. Put bluntly,
during that time, judges and commentators have repeatedly
revised major legal doctrines while pretending to simply apply
existing doctrine, and the cumulative effect of their
misdescriptions has often produced mythical descriptions of
framing-era doctrine.26 Hence, descriptions of original meaning
that depend upon post-framing sources are rarely accurate.
23
In a 2003 article, I had previously noted that all of the English cases first
reported in Thomas Leach’s Cases in Crown Law were published too late to have come
to the Framers’ attention prior to the framing of the Bill of Rights because that volume
was not published until 1789. See Davies, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 102628. In my 2005 article criticizing Crawford, I was able to document more precisely that
Leach’s volume could not have been published any earlier than May 1789—although it
could have been later—because that volume reported a case from late April 1789. See
Davies, supra note 2, at 160-62 n.182.
Additional information now suggests that the first edition was probably
published late in 1789. Mr. Kry has informed me that the 1792 second edition of
Leach’s reports presented cases only through July 1791. See Kry, supra note 3, at 520
n.107. Thus, there was a publication delay in the 1792 second edition of at least six
months after the last reported case. If there were a similar delay in the first edition, it
would not have been published in London earlier than October 1789.
Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that Americans did not immediately
consult Leach’s reports of Old Bailey cases when they were published. See infra notes
289, 296, 301.
24
See infra notes 175-92 and accompanying text.
25
See infra text accompanying notes 206-10.
26
For example, modern Supreme Court opinions have stated that “probable
cause” was the pre-framing—or even the ancient—arrest standard, but that is only a
myth. If one consults historical statements of arrest standards it is patent that
nineteenth-century English and American courts had relaxed the framing-era “felony
in fact” arrest standard to the modern “probable cause” standard, and had conferred
more arrest authority on peace officers than private persons, all without
acknowledging those changes. See, e.g., Davies, Fourth Amendment, supra note 20, at
634-40, 639 n.252.
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Thus, in my 2005 article, I argued that Justice Scalia’s
“cross-examination rule” was itself a misstatement of the
original content of the Confrontation Clause that would exclude
some out-of-court statements that framing-era law would have
treated as admissible evidence. I argued that the significant
date for assessing the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause was the Clause’s 1789 framing date, rather than the
1791 ratification date that Justice Scalia used in Crawford.27 I
also pointed out that no statement that could constitute a
“cross-examination rule” had appeared in the discussions of the
admissibility of Marian witness examinations in any of the
legal authorities that the American Framers actually could
have consulted prior to the 1789 framing.28
In particular, no statements imposing a crossexamination requirement on Marian witness examinations
appeared in any of the leading eighteenth-century English
treatises on criminal procedure and evidence, or in any of the
excerpts of those treatises that appeared in the justice of the
peace manuals that were published in America and widely
used by the framing-era American officials who took Marian
witness examinations. Rather, the framing-era authorities
simply indicated that the written record of a sworn Marian
examination was admissible if the witness had become

There is also an even larger dimension of the judicial revision of the
Framers’ understanding of constitutional criminal procedure protections; namely, the
state supreme courts and the Federal Supreme Court relocated the standard for lawful
arrest from its initial locus in the state “law of the land” constitutional clauses and in
the Fifth Amendment requirement of “due process of law” to the state provisions
banning general warrants and to the Fourth Amendment, which was initially only a
ban against legislative approval of general warrants—again without any
acknowledgement by the judges who brought about that massive alteration of doctrine
and constitutional content. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 216 n.344.
27
Although the Bill of Rights was not ratified until December 1791, the text
of the Confrontation Clause took its final form on July 11, 1789, and the Bill of Rights
was adopted by the First Congress on September 25, 1789. See Davies, supra note 2, at
157-60. I argued that the original meaning has to be that which informed the First
Congress, not merely the later ratifiers. Id. I further argued that, as a general matter,
statements appearing in English sources after 1775 probably do not constitute valid
evidence of the American original understanding of provisions of the Bill of Rights. Id.
at 153-56. The use of the inappropriate 1791 date mattered for Justice Scalia’s
analysis in Crawford because it seemed to allow the use of a 1791 English decision (so
long as one did not consider when the case report was published) and also because it
allowed Justice Scalia to deflect statements by English judges in the 1790 English
decision in King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B.). See Crawford, 541
U.S. at 54-55 n.5. I explain the difficulty Eriswell posed infra notes 218-40 and
accompanying text.
28
Davies, supra note 2, at 135-53, 160-62.
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genuinely unavailable prior to trial.29 Hence, Justice Scalia
misstated the authentic history when he claimed that the
American Framers would have understood that there was a
settled rule that the admissibility of a Marian examination of
an unavailable witness depended on the defendant having had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the time the
examination was taken. There is no evidence that framing-era
Americans were aware of any such rule.
I agreed that endorsements of a cross-examination rule
began to appear in English authorities that reached America in
the decades after the framing of the Confrontation Clause, and
that such a rule also became evident in nineteenth-century
American state cases.30 However, I concluded that Justice
Scalia had made a prochronistic error when he asserted that
the original Confrontation Clause included an existing crossexamination rule.31 Thus, I identified both Justice Scalia’s
cross-examination
rule
claim
and
his
unhistorical
testimonial/nontestimonial hearsay distinction as further
examples of historical fiction in Supreme Court originalist
claims regarding criminal procedure.32
C.

Mr. Kry’s Response to One of My Criticisms

Mr. Kry now responds to my criticism of Crawford’s
originalist claim of a cross-examination rule by asserting an
expansive view of what can constitute valid evidence of original
meaning. Indeed, he ups the ante by invoking substantial
additional materials that pertain to English Marian practices
that were not mentioned in Crawford.
In particular, Kry agrees that Marian procedure was a
standard feature of felony prosecutions in England and
America during the eighteenth century, but complains that I
overlooked how Marian committal hearings were actually
conducted in eighteenth-century England, or at least in

29

Id. at 143-52, 182-87.
Id. at 173-78, 187.
31
Id. at 119, 161. See also id. at 116 n.34 (defining “prochronism” as the
specific form of anachronism in which later conceptions are imposed on earlier
understandings).
32
Id. at 188-89 (describing the claim of a framing-era cross-examination rule
as “historical fiction”). I have used the phrase before in discussing historical errors in
Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 239 (titled “The
Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism”).
30
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London.33 He asserts that the arrestee was “routinely,” or even
“almost invariably,” present when a Marian witness
examination was taken,34 and that this in-the-presence-of-theprisoner practice evolved into an in-the-presence rule, which
then further evolved “at some point” into a rule that a Marian
witness examination was inadmissible unless the arrestee had
had an opportunity to cross-examine.35 Additionally, Kry
insists it is appropriate to project statements in nineteenthcentury English cases and commentaries and nineteenthcentury American state cases backward in time and treat them
as valid evidence of an earlier, framing-era American
understanding of the confrontation right. Thus, he treats postframing sources as evidence of the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause.36 Like Justice Scalia in Crawford,
however, Kry pays little attention to what the American
Framers could have known, or when they could have known it.
D.

Overview of My Reply

I welcome this exchange with Mr. Kry because I think it
provides a useful opportunity to reiterate the requisites of a
valid claim of original meaning. In Part II, I argue that,
precisely because originalists assert that original meaning
should be accorded a heightened normative status in
constitutional discourse, it is appropriate to insist that they
exercise historical discipline and make a claim of original
meaning only when there is clear historical evidence of the
Framers’ understanding when the provision at issue was
framed.
In Part III, I call attention to an important point that
should not be lost amid the specific disagreements between Kry
and me: although Kry attacks my article, he makes a
significantly different and significantly weaker historical claim
than that asserted in Crawford itself. Although Kry’s general
remarks sometimes conflate an in-the-presence practice with a
cross-examination rule, his pre-framing evidence indicates, at
most, only a London framing-era practice in which Marian
examinations were taken in the presence of “the prisoner” (that

33
34
35
36

See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
See Kry, supra note 3, at 495, 512-16.
See id. at 495.
Id. at 545-48.
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is, the arrestee37), but not the supposedly settled rule requiring
an opportunity for cross-examination that Justice Scalia
asserted in Crawford.
In particular, although Justice Scalia invoked the 1791
date of the ratification of the Bill of Rights as the relevant date
for original meaning in Crawford,38 Kry does not actively
dispute my conclusion that the important date for assessing
original meaning is the date of the framing in 1789.39
Additionally, Kry concedes at several points that, even in
London, as of 1789 there still was only a controversy but not a
settled rule regarding an arrestee’s opportunity to crossexamine during a Marian witness examination.40 Hence, even
compared to Kry’s historical account of London practice, Justice
Scalia’s originalist claim in Crawford regarding a settled
“cross-examination rule” was fictional.
In Part IV, I respond to the specific pre-framing
evidence that Kry offers for his conclusion that an in-thepresence-of-the-prisoner standard had become part of English
Marian practice by the time of the framing, and argue that his
conclusions outrun his evidence. I begin by challenging his
suggestion that the mere requirement that Marian witness
examinations be taken before an arrestee was committed to jail
to await trial or was released on bail supports an inference that
the defendant necessarily would have been present.
I next reiterate the profound silence in the framing-era
legal authorities as to even an in-the-presence rule. In my
prior article, I noted the absence of any reference to crossexamination in the statements regarding the admissibility of
Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses in criminal
37
Framing-era usage deemed an arrest to be “the beginning of
imprisonment.” See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 392 n.518. Hence, the arrestee
was commonly referred to as the “prisoner” and that term was also commonly used to
identify the defendant in a criminal trial.
38
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46, 54 n.5.
39
Davies, supra note 2, at 157-60. Kry writes that he “take[s] no position on
whether 1789 or 1791 is the more relevant date for assessing original meaning because
[he does] not view that two-year difference as having much practical significance.”
Kry, supra note 3, at 522 n.119. However, he effectively concedes that 1789 is the
significant date when he repeatedly refers to the date “of the framing” throughout his
article. Of course, the date “of the framing” is 1789. See supra note 27.
40
See infra text accompanying notes 65-67. Additionally, in Crawford,
Justice Scalia downplayed Marian procedure as merely a departure from “common
law.” See Davies, supra note 2, at 132-35. In contrast, Kry acknowledges that
“[b]ecause those Marian examinations were a routine feature of felony prosecutions at
the time the Sixth Amendment was framed, their admissibility is relevant to any
general theory of the Confrontation Clause.” Kry, supra note 3, at 493-94.
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trials. In this article, I point out that the same silence also
appears in the framing-era descriptions of Marian procedure
itself. I also call more attention to a point I only touched on
before—that a number of the framing-era authorities, including
the leading English justice of the peace manual, actually
contrasted Marian witness examinations to the crossexamination standard that applied to depositions taken in civil
lawsuits.
Hence, the legal authorities that framing-era
Americans could have consulted regarding the arrestee’s
presence or opportunity to cross-examine during a Marian
witness examination did not indicate any such legal
requirements.
I then turn to the pre-framing English evidence Kry
offers regarding the practice of taking Marian witness
examinations in the presence of the arrestee. I initially
consider the two seventeenth-century sources Kry invokes.
Kry insists that the 1696 ruling in King v. Paine and the 1696
attainder proceeding in Parliament in Fenwick’s Case provide
significant evidence. I persist in the view that Paine, as a
ruling in a misdemeanor case, carried no implications for the
Marian procedure that applied specifically to all felony
prosecutions. I likewise persist in the opinion that it is highly
unlikely that Americans were aware of any discussion of a
witness deposition in Fenwick.41 Additionally, I note that Kry’s
conclusion that there was only a controversy about crossexamination in Marian examinations in London in 1789
demonstrates rather clearly that these two cases could not
have been understood to have mandated a cross-examination
rule during the eighteenth century.
Moving on to Kry’s description of eighteenth-century
Marian practice in England, I argue that, regardless of the
historical validity of his description of the evolution of English
Marian practice (which strikes me as plausible), the practice he
describes still does not constitute significant evidence of the
American understanding of the confrontation right at the time
of the framing in 1789. For one thing, common practices are
not equivalent to legal rules or rights.
Although Kry
sometimes concludes that there was an in-the-presence rule by
the time of the framing, the evidence he presents falls short of
41
As I discuss below, Kry does correctly point out that I overlooked the
potential implication of a margin citation to a page in the report of Fenwick that
appeared in a prominent treatise; however, I do not think that alters the larger picture.
See infra text accompanying notes 152-60.
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a rule, and far short of the settled cross-examination rule that
Justice Scalia asserted in Crawford. Moreover, it is unclear
that the London practices that Kry describes were even typical
of the rest of England; there is no reason to assume they shed
light on American Marian practices. Of course, it is also
unclear how framing-era Americans would have learned of the
English practices Kry describes in the absence of any published
accounts.
The salient feature of Kry’s evidence about Marian
procedure is what is missing—he does not identify a single
legal authority that states a Marian in-the-presence rule that
Americans could have consulted prior to the 1789 framing of
the Confrontation Clause. Hence, I do not think Kry has
identified evidence that framing-era Americans would have
thought that Marian witness examinations were subject to
even a legal in-the-presence requirement, let alone the settled
cross-examination rule that Justice Scalia asserted in
Crawford.
In Part V, I discuss Kry’s heavy reliance on postframing materials, including nineteenth-century English cases
and commentaries and nineteenth-century American state
cases. Although Kry sometimes discusses these sources in
terms of relevance, he relies on them so heavily that he
effectively projects nineteenth-century English statements
backward in time as though they provide direct evidence of the
framing-era American understanding of the confrontation
right. However, I think that Kry’s reliance upon post-framing
statements collides with the story Kry himself tells about
evolution and change in English Marian practice. How can
later sources provide evidence of earlier understandings if legal
practices and doctrine were undergoing change? Legal history
refutes any assumption of necessary doctrinal consistency over
time because it provides innumerable examples of judges and
commentators who reshaped earlier cases and authorities to
comport with the preferred conceptions of their own times.42
Post-framing sources reveal only post-framing understandings;
they cannot be taken as accurate guides to earlier, framing-era
understandings.
Finally, in Part VI, I briefly conclude by calling
attention to one of the most serious drawbacks of originalist
42
See, e.g., Frederic Maitland, Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge (1888),
quoted in 3 PETER GAY & VICTORIA G. WEXLER, HISTORIANS AT WORK 301-02 (1975).
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justifications for constitutional rulings—the absence of any
procedure for vetting the historical validity of originalist claims
constructed in a single justice’s chambers before those claims
become enshrined in an opinion of the Court.
II.

WHAT BURDEN OF PROOF SHOULD ORIGINALISTS MEET?

Much of the difference between Kry’s historical account
and mine, and between Crawford’s account and mine, arises
from a difference of opinion regarding the burden of proof that
originalists should meet.
Precisely because originalists
attribute a privileged normative position to claims about the
original understanding of a constitutional provision, I think it
is appropriate to insist that originalists practice originalism
with historical discipline.
Of course, judges often justify decisions by claiming
continuity with the past—stare decisis is simply a claim that
“we have done it that way before.” If the claim is also that “we
have done it that way for a long time,” that adds a
traditionalist gloss.
However, traditionalism is obviously
vulnerable to arguments that conditions have changed or that
the evolution of legal conceptions and standards has made
prior conceptions obsolete. If recent developments have broken
from an earlier traditional position, traditionalism itself does
not provide a justification for returning to the earlier position.
For example, Justice Scalia could hardly have justified the
adoption of the cross-examination rule simply by noting that
mid-nineteenth century American cases adopted such a rule
even if recent decisions have not.
Originalism is different. Originalism rests on the
premise that a constitutional provision’s original meaning—the
public meaning when it was framed43—is the content to which
the Framers agreed.
Thus, originalists accord original
meaning the normative stature of the political contract itself.
Moreover, originalists attribute a fixed content to the original
meaning.44 Because they characterize the original meaning as
unchanging, originalists present claims about the original

43

See Davies, supra note 2, at 105 n.1.
For example, Justice Scalia has recently declared, “There is nothing new or
surprising in the proposition that our unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of
law that might themselves change. . . . This reference to changeable law poses no
problem for the originalist.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 1515,
1540 (2006).
44
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meaning as though they carry considerably more normative
punch than a simple traditionalist claim.
In particular, because originalism posits a fixed original
meaning, originalism uniquely can seem to justify wiping out
recent legal developments in order to return to the purportedly
fixed original meaning. For example, Crawford itself wiped out
several decades of prior confrontation rulings.45 The unique
platform that originalism provides for undoing precedents is
probably the primary attraction that originalism now holds for
justices toward the right end of the Court’s ideological
spectrum. Originalism provides a justification for breaching
the norm of stare decisis that otherwise protects recent “liberal”
doctrinal developments, and thus provides a justification for
wiping out those developments.46 Hence, originalism today is
often a platform for “activist” rulings.47
If originalists are going to claim this added normative
punch, it seems appropriate that they should invoke claims of
original meaning with historical discipline—that is, claims
45
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980), a precedent that was just shy of lasting for a quarter of a century.
46
For a discussion of the recent emphasis on originalism in constitutional
criminal procedure cases, see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1745-70 (2000). See also Davies, supra note 2, at 207;
Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 252-66.
The cross-examination rule adopted in Crawford may appear somewhat
“liberal” in the sense that it provides a more substantial content to a criminal
defendant’s confrontation right than prior law. However, that is only one prong of
Crawford; the other prong, the limitation of the confrontation right to “testimonial”
hearsay, has a different ideological content, and—depending on how the boundary
between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay is ultimately defined—may yet mean
that the strong protection afforded by the cross-examination rule applicable to
“testimonial” hearsay will rarely apply, in which case the confrontation right will have
little practical substance.
To date, Crawford and Davis have treated only statements obtained during
police interrogation as “testimonial” statements subject to the cross-examination rule.
Moreover, Davis has indicated that only statements made during police interrogations
that were conducted “primarily” to obtain evidence will be deemed “testimonial,” and
has suggested that statements obtained during interrogations will “often” be
“nontestimonial” and not subject to the confrontation right or its cross-examination
rule. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006).
Davis has also limited the scope of the confrontation right, and its crossexamination rule, by indicating that even “testimonial” hearsay statements may be
admitted in hearings to determine whether a defendant has “forfeited” his
confrontation right by preventing a potential witness from appearing at trial. Id. at
___, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80. Hence, it may yet turn out that Crawford’s crossexamination rule will bar hearsay evidence only infrequently. See also supra note 21.
47
It may not be coincidental that a recent study has concluded that Justices
Scalia and Thomas are somewhat more prone to overturn prior precedents than the
other justices. See Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of
Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming
2007).
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about the Framers’ design should be made only in instances
when valid and relevant historical sources provide strong
evidence of the Framers’ understanding of a constitutional
provision at the time the provision was framed. After all,
original meaning is hardly a necessary ground of decision.
Most of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions do not
rest on originalist justifications. Indeed, even those justices
who purport to be originalists resort to originalism rather
selectively.48 Hence, there is no excuse for fictional originalist
claims that are based only on weak, marginal, or nonexistent
evidence, rather than on the most direct historical evidence of
what the Framers actually knew and thought at the time of the
framing.49
Mr. Kry apparently has a more relaxed view of the
criteria for valid originalist claims.
Indeed, he defends
Crawford’s originalist cross-examination rule claim even
though he offers a markedly different historical account of
Marian procedure than that which appeared in Crawford itself
and arrives at a significantly weaker conclusion.
III.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KRY’S HISTORY AND
JUSTICE SCALIA’S

As I indicated in my previous article, I had difficulty
deciphering precisely what historical claim Justice Scalia made
in Crawford when he cryptically referred to the admission of
Marian witness examinations as a “derogation” of a commonlaw cross-examination rule.50 Because I thought Justice Scalia
was most likely arguing that Marian examinations of witnesses
who had died or had otherwise become unavailable had once
been admitted in criminal trials without consideration of crossexamination, but that framing-era English law had come to
impose a cross-examination requirement as a condition for
admitting a Marian examination as evidence in a criminal
trial, I focused on that admissibility claim. I found no evidence
48

See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 260-62.
As is probably clear to the reader by this point, I am not an originalist. I
do not research original meaning to formulate a program for returning to framing-era
conceptions of rights or to promote an alternative originalist program to that endorsed
by the self-described originalists on the Supreme Court. Rather, I think that an
authentic reconstruction of the Framers’ conception of criminal procedure can provide a
useful perspective on the larger trajectory of constitutional criminal procedure and may
also provide an antidote, to some degree, to the mythical conceptions that too often
appear in United States Reports.
50
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46.
49
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in the framing-era authorities that an opportunity for crossexamination had been made a criterion for admitting a Marian
witness examination of an unavailable witness in a felony
trial.51
Kry now asserts that I focused on the wrong argument.
Instead, he contends that Crawford should be read to make
what I termed a more “nuanced” claim—that cross-examination
emerged within Marian procedure itself, and had become a
settled part of that procedure by the time of the framing.52
Thus, Kry argues that when the framing-era authorities that I
quoted stated that Marian examinations of unavailable
witnesses were admissible as evidence in criminal trials, those
statements implicitly incorporated an in-the-presence or crossexamination rule as an aspect of Marian procedure itself.53
Whether Kry’s historical analysis is actually the same
as that which Justice Scalia advanced in Crawford is far from
clear, however, because many of Justice Scalia’s statements
appear to refer to admissibility rather than to any internal
standard for Marian procedure. Justice Scalia stated the
historical issue as whether “the admissibility of an unavailable
witness’s pretrial examination depended on whether the
defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine him.”54
Then, when discussing seventeenth and eighteenth-century
law, Justice Scalia stated that “[t]he [Marian] statutes did not
identify the circumstances under which [Marian] examinations
were admissible,” and observed that those who claimed during
that period that “no prior opportunity for cross-examination
was required” for admitting Marian examinations had
acknowledged that “the statutes were in derogation of the
common law.”55 For example, Justice Scalia noted that a
leading authority on evidence had stated that Marian
examinations were “admissible only ‘by Force “of the [Marian]
Statute.”’”56 The implication in that statement is that Marian
examinations were admissible even though they did not provide
the opportunity for cross-examination that was usually a
requisite for admissibility. Likewise, Justice Scalia later wrote
that “to the extent Marian examinations were admissible, it
51
52
53
54
55
56

See Davies, supra note 2, at 143-52, 182-86.
Id. at 169-78.
Kry, supra note 3, at 499-501.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis altered) (quoting 1 GILBERT, EVIDENCE 215).

2007]

REVISITING FICTIONAL ORIGINALISM

575

was only because the statutes derogated from the common law”
but that “the statutory-derogation view” was “rejected” by
1791.57 That statement also implies that Marian examinations
had been admitted despite the absence of cross-examination in
Marian procedure (that is, despite the way in which the
statutes “derogated” common law), but that the English courts
later rejected that special allowance for Marian examinations
by making an opportunity for cross-examination a requisite for
admitting even Marian examinations into evidence in a felony
trial.
At least for purposes of assessing the validity of
originalism as an approach to constitutional justification, it
matters whether Mr. Kry is articulating the same analysis as
that in Crawford or not. Justice Scalia’s originalist claims are
not salvaged by demonstrating that Justice Scalia could have
arrived at a historical conclusion by a route he did not take.
Likewise, even if Kry’s analysis does parallel that in Crawford,
it is unclear how Kry’s presentation of evidence that was never
mentioned in Crawford can rehabilitate the absence of valid
historical evidence in the Crawford opinion itself.
Most importantly, Kry’s historical conclusion is
decidedly weaker than Justice Scalia’s. In Crawford, Justice
Scalia repeatedly invoked “the Framers,” “the founding,” and
“1791,”58 and specifically asserted that “the Framers would not
have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.”59 In other words, Justice Scalia asserted

57
Id. at 54 n.5 (first emphasis added). Justice Scalia also based his claim
regarding the “reject[ion]” of the “statutory derogation” on the three English cases
decided in 1787, 1789, and 1791 that I discuss infra notes 175-217 and accompanying
text. However, the issue in each of those cases was the admissibility of a witness’s
examination.
Likewise, Justice Scalia described the issue in a key 1790 English decision
in terms of whether the admissibility of Marian examinations was “a statutory
exception to the common-law rule.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-55 n.5.
58
Id. (passim).
59
Id. at 53-54. See also id. at 54 n.5 (asserting that Chief Justice Rehnquist
was incorrect when he claimed that “English law’s treatment of testimonial statements
was inconsistent at the time of the framing,” and that “by 1791 even the statutoryderogation view had been rejected with respect to [Marian] examinations”).
Kry suggests that I have overstated the originalist claim actually made in
Crawford, because Justice Scalia’s opinion recognized “doubts” regarding the crossexamination rule; and Kry also claims that I have overstated the differences between
his account and that in Crawford. See Kry, supra note 3, at 494 n.10, 555 n.287.
However, I think Kry understates what Crawford actually claimed. Moreover, if
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that a settled rule that Marian examinations were admissible
only if there had been an opportunity for cross-examination
was part of the original understanding of the Confrontation
Clause. Although Kry may seem to endorse Justice Scalia’s
claim in rhetorical flourishes at the beginning60 and end of his
article,61 he does not actually defend that claim when he
addresses the pre-framing evidence itself.
Rather, Kry describes the English historical evidence
regarding cross-examination as “conflicting.”62 Indeed, when
Kry sums up the pre-framing English historical evidence, he
asserts only “that prisoners would have been routinely present
when witnesses were deposed at Marian committal hearings,”
“that presence was widely viewed as a procedural right by the
time of the framing,”63 or “that, by the framing, there was also
an emerging consensus that presence was a procedural right,”64
and “that many believed a prisoner had a right to crossexamine witnesses at his committal hearing, but that the point
was still disputed at the time of the framing.”65 Likewise,
although Kry asserts that a cross-examination rule emerged in
England “at some point” (without stating a date),66 the
strongest summation he musters of the English pre-framing
evidence is that it “suggests that, at the time of the framing,
the right to cross-examine at a committal hearing was not
firmly established, but nor was the absence of such a right
firmly established. Rather, there was disagreement . . . .”67 Kry
does not show that a cross-examination rule had even emerged
in England as of 1789, let alone show that such a rule was part
of the original Sixth Amendment. 68
Kry’s conclusions decidedly do not amount to the settled
cross-examination rule that Justice Scalia claimed in
Crawford had made only the weaker historical claims Kry now makes, it would hardly
have presented a claim of original meaning.
60
Kry, supra note 3, at 494 (“Crawford is well supported by the historical
evidence.”).
61
Id. at 555 (“Crawford’s cross-examination rule is therefore on solid ground.
If the opinion is to be faulted for anything, it is only for understating the importance of
physical presence, not for overstating the importance of cross-examination.”).
62
Id. at 542.
63
Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
64
Id. at 512 (emphasis added). See also id. at 553 (“[T]he admissibility of ex
parte committal examinations was far from settled.”).
65
Id. at 495 (emphasis added). See also id. at 525.
66
Kry, supra note 3, at 495.
67
Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
68
See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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Crawford. Whatever one concludes about Kry’s attacks on my
article, they do not constitute a defense of the originalist crossexamination rule Crawford actually claimed.
With that
observation, let me nevertheless address Kry’s own claim of an
English framing-era in-the-presence practice or rule.
IV.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF KRY’S CLAIMS REGARDING PREFRAMING EVIDENCE

A claim of original meaning is, by definition, a claim in
which the date of the framing is of the essence. Hence,
although Kry tends to mix together pre-framing and postframing materials, I think it is essential to keep them separate.
I discuss his pre-framing claims in this Part, and reserve his
post-framing claims for the next. I think the important issue is
whether Kry has identified valid evidence of the American
Framers’ understanding of the Confrontation Clause when it
was framed—and I think the fair conclusion is that he has not.
Kry does not contest my basic point—that the framingera treatises and justice of the peace manuals that were widely
used in framing-era America do not mention any in-thepresence or cross-examination standards for Marian witness
examinations. Rather, he dismisses that consistent silence as a
mere “negative inference.”69 Instead, he offers two broad
inferences of the must-have variety, and also offers a variety of
evidence regarding English Marian practice to lend credence to
those inferences. I begin by identifying the fallacies in Kry’s
inferences, and then reiterate the profound silence of the
framing-era legal authorities before moving on to the specific
evidence of English practice that Kry offers.
A.

The Invalidity of Kry’s Must-Have Inferences

Kry offers two inferences of the must-have variety to
support his historical claims. One is that because testimony in
the presence of the defendant and subject to cross-examination
was a requirement in other procedural contexts, especially
criminal trials, “consistency” would require that Marian
procedure include similar features. The simple answer is that
one cannot assume that Marian procedure, created by statutory
authority, was subject to common-law norms. Rather, because

69

Kry, supra note 3, at 500.
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statutes trumped common law, Marian procedure was sui
generis.
Moreover, sworn Marian examinations of unavailable
witnesses were not the only form of admissible evidence that
departed from the usual principles that evidence in a criminal
trial had to be presented in the defendant’s presence and
subject to cross-examination. That was equally true of a
murder victim’s dying declaration.70 Dying declarations were
admissible because the victim’s awareness of imminent death
was thought to be the functional equivalent of an oath,71 and
because such declarations often amounted to the “best
evidence” available of the crime.72 The same was true of
Marian witness examinations of unavailable witnesses; they
were made under oath, and they too could provide important
evidence, or even the best evidence, of the crime—evidence that
would otherwise be unavailable.73 Hence, there was no reason
why Marian procedure should comport with trial procedure.74
70
There is no dispute that dying declarations were admissible under
framing-era law. See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (existence of dying declaration
exception “as general rule of hearsay law cannot be disputed”); Kry, supra note 3, at
546. See also infra note 73 (quoting statement by English judge in 1789 confirming
admissibility of murder victim’s dying declaration).
71
See 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 619 n.10 (1787 ed.) (textual note
added by editor).
72
See id. Thomas Leach added the section and note discussing the
admissibility of a murder victim’s dying declaration immediately after the section he
added discussing the “best evidence” rule. See id.
73
As Chief Baron Eyre stated in the 1789 ruling in King v. Woodcock, one of
the cases cited in Crawford:

The most common and ordinary species of legal evidence consists in the
depositions of witnesses taken on oath before the Jury, in the face of the
Court, in the presence of the prisoner, and received under all the advantages
which examination and cross-examination can give. But beyond this kind of
evidence there are also two species which are admitted by law: The one is the
dying declaration of a person who has received a fatal blow: the other is the
examination of a prisoner, and the depositions of the witnesses who may be
produced against him, taken officially before a Justice of the Peace, by virtue
of [the Marian statutes], which authorizes Magistrates to take such
examinations, and directs that they shall be returned to the Court of Gaol
Delivery. This last species of deposition, if the deponent should die between
the time of examination and the trial of the prisoner, may be substituted in
the room of that viva voce testimony which the deponent, if living, could alone
have given, and is admitted of necessity as evidence of the fact.
Leach (1st ed. 1789) 437, 439, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 501-02, 168 Eng. Rep. at 35253 (Old Bailey 1789).
74
Of course, although the grand jury was an important phase of the framingera right to jury trial in felony cases, the defendant played no role, and was not
permitted to cross-examine during that phase of the criminal trial. Hence, it is hardly
the case that cross-examination was a feature of all phases of a criminal prosecution;
rather, it was expected to be a component of the trial before the petit jury.
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This is also true of Kry’s second must-have inference.
He notes that, although the Marian statutes did not say
anything about the presence of the arrestee or about the
arrestee having an opportunity for cross-examination during
the taking of a witness’s information about a felony, the
statutes did indicate that witness examinations were to be
taken before the justice of the peace either committed the
arrestee to jail to await trial or bailed the arrestee.75 Likewise,
Kry infers that the statutory authority for examinations of the
witnesses who brought the prisoner to the justice of the peace
means that the prisoner “necessarily” would have been present
when the witnesses were examined.76
However, there is an obvious reason why the statute
required the witness examination to be completed before
committal or bail that does not depend upon the arrestee’s
presence when a witness examination was taken. A justice of
the peace’s decision to commit or bail an arrestee effectively
marked the beginning of a formal prosecution. The warrant of
committal that authorized jailing the arrestee to await trial
ordered that the defendant not be released except “by due
course of law”—that is, by court proceedings, usually trial.77
Hence, it made sense that the Marian statutes would require a
justice of the peace to confirm, prior to taking that serious step,
that (1) there actually was proof that a felony had been
committed, and (2) there were witnesses who were prepared to
connect the defendant to the felony. Indeed, the treatises and
manuals indicated that a justice should release an arrestee if
these minimal thresholds for prosecution were not met, but
also stated that a justice had no discretion to release a felony
arrestee if these minimal thresholds were met.78
75

Kry, supra note 3, at 512.
Id. at 523.
77
See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 395 n.521.
78
See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 293 (1st ed. 1769). (“If upon this enquiry [the Marian post-arrest procedure]
it manifestly appears, either that no such crime was committed, or that the suspicion
entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless, in such cases only it is lawful totally
to discharge him. Otherwise he must either be committed to prison, or give bail . . . .”).
See also infra note 246 (citing framing-era American justice of the peace manuals for
the same point).
As I have previously noted, the common Bluebook rule for citing the
“starred” edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries is inappropriate for historical
commentary because that is the 1783 ninth London edition, the last that contains
Blackstone’s own changes. See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 278 n.119. However,
because Blackstone sometimes changed the contents, that edition may be different
from the earlier editions, including the 1771-1772 American printing that was widely
76
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However, a justice of the peace could ascertain whether
these minimum committal standards were met simply by
listening to the witnesses. Indeed, because a justice of the
peace had no authority to try a felony charge, he was not
supposed to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but simply
to determine whether the proffered evidence supported the
arrest.79 Hence, the justice could perform the required task
even if the constable had escorted the arrestee out of the
justice’s parlor to another place of temporary detention pending
the justice’s disposition—and surely some arrestees were illbehaved enough to merit removal from the justice’s parlor. The
cryptic language of the Marian statutes and the absence of
specific directions for taking witness examinations imply that
the details of how the examinations were to be taken were
simply left to the discretion of the justice of the peace.
In addition, it is important to recognize that a Marian
witness examination was taken for a different purpose than
that for which depositions were taken in civil lawsuits.80
Depositions in civil lawsuits and equity proceedings were taken
with the expectation that they would be admitted into evidence
as a substitute for live trial testimony. That is, they were taken
when it was anticipated that it would be too inconvenient, too
used in framing-era America. Hence, relying on the “star” edition can result in large
historical errors. For an example, see id. at 292-300 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
revisionist interpretation of the original meaning of the term “Breach of the Peace” in
the Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1, in Williamson v. United
States, 207 U.S. 425, 435-46 (1908), in which the Court justified the result by
erroneously treating a statement in a later edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries as
though it had been what Blackstone initially wrote in 1765, when Blackstone had
taken the opposite position in the editions primarily used in America).
79
Kry asserts, based on recent historical research, that English magistrates
began to exercise broader discretion during the eighteenth century. Kry, supra note 3,
at 523, 554. However, as far as I can determine, that change was not reflected in the
treatises or justice of the peace manuals, including the justice of the peace manuals
published in framing-era America. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
80
To avoid confusion, I refer to Marian witness statements as “examinations”
rather than “depositions” in this article because I think that use of the latter term
tends to obscure the significant differences between Marian procedure and civil
litigation depositions.
Although Marian witness statements are often called
“depositions” in modern historical works, and Kry consistently calls Marian witness
examinations “depositions” in his article, as I did likewise in my 2002 article, that is
not the usual framing-era label. The Marian statutes referred to taking the
“information” of the witnesses. However, it is awkward to refer to Marian witness
informations, and the term “informations” carries other baggage in the criminal
context. Historical sources sometimes referred to Marian witness statements as
“depositions” but more commonly called them “examinations” (the term the Marian
statutes actually used for statements by the arrestee). For an example of a historical
source that refers to Marian witness statements as both “depositions” and
“examinations,” see infra note 82.
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expensive, or otherwise impossible for a witness to attend the
civil lawsuit trial.81 Because depositions in civil proceedings
were taken to be used as trial evidence, they were subject to a
cross-examination rule comparable to that which applied in
trials: depositions could be readily admitted as a substitute for
live testimony in civil lawsuits if, but only if, the opposing
party had an opportunity to attend and cross-examine when
the deposition was taken.82

81
In the eighteenth century, depositions could be taken to be used as
evidence in civil lawsuits and equity proceedings. See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note
78, at 383 (1st ed. 1768) (use of depositions in lawsuits); id. at 449 (use of depositions in
equity proceedings). Depositions do not seem to have been taken for discovery as they
are today, because modern discovery procedures had not yet been developed.
The expectation that depositions would be used as a substitute for live
testimony in trials in civil lawsuits was the actual subject of a 1787 Letter of a Federal
Farmer that was incorrectly quoted in Crawford as though it were a direct antecedent
of the Confrontation Clause applicable to criminal trials. However, the letter was so
heavily edited that the concern with the use of depositions as evidence in civil trials
was obscured. Justice Scalia portrayed the Letter in Crawford as follows:

[A] prominent Antifederalist writing under the pseudonym Federal Farmer
criticized the use of “written evidence” while objecting to the omission of a
vicinage right: “Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining [of]
witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts in question. . . .
[W]ritten evidence . . . [is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex
parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.” The First
Congress responded by including the Confrontation Clause in the proposal
that became the Sixth Amendment.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
However, the quoted passage actually appeared in a passage that
discussed the vicinage (that is, venue) aspect of “[t]he trials by jury in civil causes.”
Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. 4 (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in CONTEXTS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION ON PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 706, 710 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1999) (emphasis added). The
Federal Farmer stated that he did not place much weight on the need to be tried by
one’s neighbors, but then wrote that it was important for trials in civil causes (that is,
lawsuits) to be held in the vicinity for the convenience of obtaining oral testimony from
witnesses so that it would not be necessary to resort to the use of depositions:
[T]he trial of facts in the neighbourhood is of great importance in other
respects. Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining witnesses,
and generally before the triers of the facts in question. The common people
can establish facts with much more ease with oral than written evidence;
when trials of facts are removed to a distance from the homes of the parties
and witnesses, oral evidence becomes intolerably expensive, and the parties
must depend on written evidence, which to the common people is expensive
and almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom
leads to the proper discovery of truth.
Id. Although this passage reflects the general importance attached to oral testimony
and cross-examination, it did so while expressing concern about the expected use of
depositions in civil cases, rather than in criminal trials.
82
See GILBERT, supra note 15, at 46-47, 48 (1754 ed.); id. at 61-62, 63-64
(1777 ed.).
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In contrast, Marian witness examinations were not
taken with an expectation that they would be offered as
evidence of the defendant’s guilt at trial.83 Because a Marian
witness examination was admissible only if the witness had
become genuinely unavailable—strictly defined as death,
serious illness, or interference by the defendant84—there was
little likelihood that any particular Marian examination would
be admitted as evidence at trial. That was especially so
because the pace of framing-era criminal prosecutions was
considerably speedier than modern proceedings, so there was
little likelihood that a witness would die or become seriously ill
during the short period between the date of the Marian
examination and the subsequent trial.85
In the usual course of events, the witnesses who brought
the arrestee to the justice of the peace and were examined
under Marian procedure would also appear and testify in
person at the subsequent trial. Indeed, the justice was
supposed to assure that they would appear for trial by binding
them to do so with a recognizance. Hence, the expectation was
that a felony defendant would have the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses who had given Marian examinations
during the course of the felony trial itself.
A Marian
examination was not supposed to be a mini-trial.
The probable purpose of the requirement that the record
of Marian witness examinations be forwarded to the trial court
was simply to provide a means by which the trial judge could
determine whether the witness had changed his or her story in

83
As Kry notes, Marian examinations were not created to be a substitute for
live testimony at criminal trials. See Kry, supra note 3, at 498 n.19 (citing JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 24-34 (1974) (“contending that
‘the Marian draftsman did not intend to institute a system of written evidence’”)).
84
See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra
note 4, at 605 (1787 ed.) (stating that a Marian witness examination was admissible as
evidence if the witness (called an “Informer”) “is dead, or unable to travel, or kept away
by the Means or Procurement of the Prisoner,” and also noting that “it is not sufficient
to authorize the Reading such an Examination, to make Oath that the Prosecutors
have used all their Endeavours to find the Witness, but cannot find him”), quoted in
Davies, supra note 2, at 147, nn.137-38.
85
For example, less than two months passed between the crime and the trial
of the defendant in King v. Radbourne, one of the cases that Justice Scalia cited in
Crawford. The attack that was prosecuted as a murder occurred on May 31, 1787 (the
“27th year” of the reign of George III), and the trial was held “[a]t the Old Bailey in
July Session 1787.” King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330
(Old Bailey 1787), cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47. Although the victim of the
attack did die in the interval in Radbourne, the dates in that case still illustrate the
speed of late eighteenth-century prosecutions.
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response to a bribe or threat.86 To meet that purpose, as well as
to test the validity of the charge on which the arrest had been
made, the Marian witness examination was taken under oath
and the witness was required to sign the written summary of
his or her examination that was then prepared by the justice.
However, there is no apparent reason why the arrestee’s
presence would have been necessary for that purpose.
In addition, it is not clear what purpose crossexamination would ordinarily have served.87 As Kry observes,
the written records of Marian witness examinations took the
form of short summaries of what the witness swore to, but did
not resemble a modern transcript.88 As a result, it is not
apparent how cross-examination would have been recorded.
The bottom line is that Kry’s must-have inferences simply do
not hold up to close inspection.89
The sui generis character of Marian procedure is also
evident in what the framing-era legal authorities had to say
about Marian procedure. In fact, there is more to say on that
score than I previously presented.

86

See Davies, supra note 2, at 129.
Kry suggests that cross-examination became relevant when English
magistrates began to exercise an extra-legal discretion as to whether felony charges
should be dismissed. See Kry, supra note 3, at 523, 554-55 (noting that crossexamination in Marian witness examinations served no purpose until this
development). He offers no evidence of whether American justices of the peace
exercised similar discretion.
88
See id. at 535-37 nn.189-92 and accompanying text.
89
There are a number of features of arrest and committal procedures that
seem to undercut an in-the-presence-of-the-arrestee rule. For one thing, many if not
most felony arrests were made by warrant. See, e.g., Davies, Fourth Amendment,
supra note 20, at 641. A sworn, signed record of the factual allegations made by the
complainant usually was made when an arrest warrant was issued. See, e.g., 1
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 582 (Sollom Emlyn ed.,
1736). Is it really likely that the justice retook the complainant’s information as a
witness after the arrest? Or is it more likely that the complainant’s sworn pre-arrest
statement became his Marian examination? If so, there was no apparent opportunity
for the arrestee to cross-examine. As I note below, in 1807, the Attorney General of the
United States stated that an affidavit for an arrest warrant could serve as a Marian
witness examination. See infra note 302 and accompanying text.
Likewise, as I discuss below, the Marian procedure entries in framing-era
justice of the peace manuals sometimes included material witness warrants, which
would seem to pose some logistical problems for the examination being taken in the
presence of the arrestee. See infra notes 103, 108-09 and accompanying text.
87
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B.

The Evidence Against an In-the-Presence or CrossExamination Rule in the Framing-Era Authorities

In my previous article, because I perceived the
originalist claim in Crawford as a claim regarding the
admissibility of Marian witness examinations,90 I noted that
the framing-era legal authorities did not mention crossexamination in the passages discussing the admissibility of a
Marian examination of an unavailable witness. In view of the
argument that Kry now makes regarding Marian procedure
itself, I should add that the silence also extends to the
discussions of Marian procedure itself.
The framing-era
authorities do not mention either an in-the-presence or crossexamination rule in the passages in which they set out the
requirements of a Marian witness examination. In fact, some
of the framing-era authorities actually contrasted Marian
procedure to depositions in civil lawsuits which were subject to
a cross-examination procedure.
1. Framing-Era Descriptions of Marian Procedure
Let me begin with the descriptions of Marian procedure
that appeared in the prominent framing-era treatises and then
address the somewhat more detailed statements in the justice
of the peace manuals.91 Like the absence of detail in the
Marian statutes themselves, the absence of detail regarding
the taking of Marian examinations in the treatises and
manuals suggests that those details were simply left to the
justice of the peace’s discretion.
a. Hale’s Treatise
Sir Matthew Hale had been one of the judges who ruled
in 1666 that a coroner’s Marian examination of an unavailable
witness would be admissible in a criminal trial.92 In my
previous article, I noted that Hale’s later treatise, The History
of the Pleas of the Crown, which was written in the late

90

See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
It does not appear that Sir Edward Coke discussed Marian committal
procedure; neither Crawford nor Kry cites any statement by Coke, and I have not
found any.
92
Kry, supra note 3, at 497.
91
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seventeenth century but not published until 1736,93 did not
make cross-examination a condition of admissibility for a
Hale’s
Marian examination of an unavailable witness.94
treatise also said nothing about either the presence of the
prisoner or an opportunity for cross-examination in its
discussion of Marian procedure itself.95

93
See HALE, supra note 89. For bibliographic information, see Davies, supra
note 2, at 130.
94
Davies, supra note 2, at 129-32.
95
The significance of how little Hale had to say about Marian witness
examinations comes through only if one reads his entire description of Marian
procedure.
This is the most complete passage on that subject, with witness
examinations being discussed in paragraphs numbered 2 and 3:

Previous to the commitment of felons, or such as are charged therewith, there
are required three things, 1. The examination of the person accused, but
without oath. 2. The farther information [beyond the complaint for the
arrest warrant] of accusers and witnesses upon oath. 3. The binding over of
the prosecutor and witnesses unto the next assizes or sessions of the peace
[that is, the criminal trial courts], as the case requires.
1. The examination of the person accused, which ought not to be upon oath,
and these examinations ought to be put in writing, and returned or certified
to the next gaol-delivery or sessions of the peace, as the case shall require by
[the Marian statutes] and being sworn by the justice or his clerk to be truly
taken may be given in evidence against the offender.
And in order thereunto, if by some reasonable occasion the justice cannot at
the return of the [arrest] warrant take the examination, he may by word of
mouth command the constable or any other person to detain in custody the
prisoner till the next day, and then to bring him before the justice for further
examination; and this detainer is justifiable by the constable, or any other
person, without shewing the particular cause, for which he was to be
examined, or any warrant in scriptis.
But the time of the detainer must be reasonable, therefore a justice cannot
justify the detainer of such person sixteen or twenty days in order to such
examination.
2. He must take information of the prosecutor or witnesses in writing upon
oath, and return or certify them at the next sessions or gaol-delivery, and
these being upon the trial sworn to be truly taken by the justice or his clerk,
&c. may be given in evidence against the prisoner, if the witnesses be dead or
not able to travel.
3. Before he commit the prisoner he is to take surety [that is, bond] of the
prosecutor to prefer his bill of indictment at the next gaol-delivery or
sessions, and likewise to give evidence; but if he be not the accuser, but an
unconcerned party, that can testify, the justice may bind him over to give
evidence, and upon refusal in either case may commit the refuser to gaol.
1 HALE, supra note 89, at 585-86 (citations omitted). I submit there is no hint in this
passage of any concern that the prisoner be present or have an opportunity to crossexamine when the witness examinations were taken. See also 1 id. at 372 (also
discussing Marian procedure); 2 id. at 46, 51-52 (also discussing Marian procedure).
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b. Hawkins’s Treatise
Although Kry, like Justice Scalia in Crawford, tends to
describe the rule of admissibility as “Hale’s,”96 the most
influential eighteenth-century treatise on criminal law and
procedure was almost certainly Sergeant William Hawkins’s
Pleas of the Crown, first published in the early eighteenth
century and republished into the nineteenth.97 In my previous
article, I noted that when Hawkins discussed the admissibility
of a Marian examination of an unavailable witness in his
chapter on evidence, he stated that “it seems settled” that
Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses were admissible
in felony trials, but—like Hale—he made no mention of any inthe-presence requirement. The only conditions that Hawkins
noted regarding admissibility were the genuine unavailability
of the witness and the requirement that the justice who took
the examination or his clerk attest that the record of the
examination was accurate.98
I should add here that Hawkins also never mentioned
any in-the-presence or cross-examination rule when he
discussed Marian committal and bail procedure itself in earlier
entries in his treatise. Rather, Hawkins simply quoted the
relevant portions of the Marian statutes and noted that a
justice of the peace should not detain a prisoner for more than
three days before examining him.99 If Hawkins had actually
understood that a Marian witness examination was invalid
unless it was taken in the presence of the prisoner, would he
not have advised justices of the peace of that requirement?
96

Kry, like Justice Scalia in Crawford, tends to place more emphasis on
Hale’s statements than on those by Hawkins and in later treatises. That treatment
may create the appearance that the 1696 rulings in Paine and Fenwick altered “Hale’s”
earlier rule of admissibility.
However, the more significant point is that
straightforward statements of the admissibility of Marian examinations of unavailable
witnesses appeared in the eighteenth-century treatises by Hawkins, Chief Baron
Geoffrey Gilbert, Francis Buller, and others, as well as in the eighteenth-century
justice of the peace manuals, and those statements tend to show that Paine and
Fenwick did not influence the understanding of Marian procedure. See Davies, supra
note 2, at 143-52.
97
See supra note 4.
98
2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra
note 4, at 605 (1787 ed.), discussed in Davies, supra note 2, at 146-50.
99
2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 118-19 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra
note 4, at 184-85 (1787 ed.) (discussing Marian committal procedure). See also 2
HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 49 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 79-80
(1787 ed.) (discussing coroners’ examinations). See also 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at
104-05 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 162-63 (1787 ed.) (discussing
bailing arrestees).
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c. Dalton’s Justice of the Peace Manual
In addition to the treatises on criminal procedure, there
was also a second category of framing-era legal authorities that
were written or compiled to inform and guide the officials who
were charged with committal and bail in felony arrests under
the Marian statutes—what are now usually called justice of the
peace manuals. The term “manual” is somewhat misleading
because these works were often quite substantial.
One of the earlier justice of the peace manuals that was
probably still in circulation to some degree in framing-era
America was Michael Dalton’s The Country Justice, initially
published in 1618, with subsequent editions to 1742 (though
the latest edition I have located is 1727).100 As was often the
case in later manuals, this work discussed Marian witness
examinations in two entries, one dealing with Marian
procedure itself, and one dealing with the admissibility of
Marian witness examinations as evidence in felony trials. The
first entry, titled “Felonies,” noted that the Marian statutes
required justices of the peace to take the information of
witnesses regarding a felony arrestee, reduce the material
contents of that information to writing, and bind the witnesses
to appear at trial, prior to either committing or bailing the
arrestee.
However, this entry does not mention any
requirement that the arrestee be present for the witness
examinations.101
The second of Dalton’s entries, titled “Evidence against
Felons,” contains similar statements about Marian procedure,
but also makes two statements that seem to cut against any inthe-presence-of-the-prisoner requirement. One states that a
justice of the peace can take and certify to the trial court the
sworn “Accusation or Information by one that is decrepit or
unable to travel”—that is, the justice can go to the witness.
However, this statement does not mention arranging to take
the arrestee along.102
The other passage indicates that the justice of the peace
can issue a warrant to a constable to bring in other persons
100
MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE (1727 ed.). For bibliographic
information, see 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 227.
101
See DALTON, supra note 100, at 105-06.
102
See id. at 541. The entire passage reads: “Accusation or Information by
one that is decrepit or unable to travel, is good, and may be taken by the Justice of the
Peace on Oath, and certified at the next general Gaol-delivery, or Sessions of the Peace,
as the Cause shall require.” Id.
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who have been identified as having material information about
a felony—that is, material witnesses. This passage also does
not mention making arrangements for the arrestee to be
present when these witnesses are found and brought in and
when their examinations are taken.103 Hence, it is fairly clear
that there was no in-the-presence rule for Marian procedure in
English law during the early eighteenth century.104 Moreover,
there is similar evidence in a later, and more important,
English justice of the peace manual.
d. Burn’s Justice of the Peace Manual
The leading eighteenth-century English justice of the
peace manual, which Blackstone recommended to law students
for the details of the role of that office in criminal procedure,
was Richard Burn’s The Justice of the Peace, and Parish
Officer, first published in London in 1755 and republished in
fourteen additional editions edited by Burn to 1785, and
Like Dalton, Burn
another fifteen thereafter to 1869.105
discussed Marian witness examinations in two entries, one for
“Examination” and one for “Evidence.”
The entry for
“Examination” addressed Marian procedure itself and also
provided relevant forms. Like Hawkins, Burn mostly just
quoted or paraphrased the statutes; he said nothing about

103

See id. at 542. The full passage begins by discussing the examinations of
the persons “who bring” the arrestee, and then continues:
And if afterwards the said Justice shall hear of any other Persons that can
inform any material Thing against the Prisoner to prove the Felony, whereof
he is suspected; he may grant his Warrant for such Persons to come before
him, and may also take their Information, &c. and may bind them to give
Evidence against the Prisoner, for every one shall be admitted to give
Evidence for the King.
Id. at 542.
104
Note that these entries are inconsistent with, and thus cast doubt on, the
implications that Kry and Crawford draw from the 1696 sources discussed infra notes
125-51 and accompanying text.
105
RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER (1st ed.
1755) (two volumes). For bibliographic information, see RICHARD WHALLEY BRIDGMAN,
A SHORT VIEW OF LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 42-43 (photo. reprint n.d.) (1807); 1 MAXWELL,
supra note 4, at 225-26. To show continuity, I also cite the 1764, 1776, 1785, and 1797
editions.
Blackstone recommended that students interested in criminal procedure
consult “Dr Burn’s justice of the peace; wherein [the student] will find every thing
relative to this subject, both in ancient and modern practice, collected with great care
and accuracy, and disposed in a most clear and judicious method.” 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 78, at 343 (1st ed. 1765).
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taking the witness examinations in the presence of the prisoner
or about cross-examination.106
The forms that accompanied the “Examination” entry
are also significant.
Although a form was provided for
“Information of a witness,” it simply tracked the prefatory
format of the form for “Examination of a felon”—it did not
include any statement that the prisoner was present when the
examination was taken.107 That silence is significant. If there
had been an in-the-presence requirement, one would expect
that a statement that the witness’s information was taken in
the presence of the prisoner would have been made a
boilerplate aspect of the form, but there was no such statement.
The “Examination” entry also contained a form for a
warrant for a “material witness”—that is, for a warrant
comparable to the one discussed by Dalton for a constable to go
out and bring in a person who was thought to possess relevant
information about the felony, so that the justice could examine
that person and record his information under oath.108 Because
this warrant pertained to a person who was not among “those
who brought” the prisoner to the justice at the time of arrest,
its inclusion also undercuts any in-the-presence legal
requirement for Marian witness examinations. If there had
been such a rule, one would expect that Burn would have said
something about the need to retrieve the defendant and bring
him in at the same time as the material witness, but Burn did
not say that. The material witness form still appears at least
as late as the 1797 edition of Burn’s manual.109
Burn’s manual is especially relevant because the justice
of the peace manuals published in America prior to the framing
borrowed heavily from it. The principal manuals reprinted his
passages on Marian procedure as well as the accompanying
forms for witness examinations and material witnesses.110
106
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 295-97 (1755 ed.) (discussing Marian
procedure); 1 id. at 536-38 (1785 ed.) (same); 1 id. at 671-73 (1797 ed.) (same).
107
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 297 (1755 ed.) (setting out forms for
examination of prisoner and information of witnesses); 1 id. at 538 (1785 ed.) (same); 1
id. at 673-74 (1797 ed.) (same).
108
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 298-99 (1755 ed.) (setting out form for material
witness warrant); 1 id. at 539-40 (1785 ed.) (same).
109
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 675 (1797 ed.) (setting out same form for
material witness warrant as in previous editions).
110
Several American manuals closely tracked Burn’s manual. See JOSEPH
GREENLEAF, AN ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER
118 (Boston 1773) (reprinting Burn’s discussion of Marian procedure and forms); JOHN
FAUCHERAUD GRIMKE, THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 199-202 (Phila. 1788)
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The consistent silences in the framing-era authorities
are powerful evidence of the “dog-that-did-not-bark-in-thenight” sort that there was no in-the-presence rule for Marian
examinations. However, there is more evidence than silence.
Several framing-era authorities juxtaposed Marian witness
examinations to depositions in civil lawsuits which were
subject to a cross-examination rule.
2. Contrasting Treatments of Marian Procedure and
Civil Litigation Deposition Procedure
a. Gilbert’s Treatise
Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert authored a leading
treatise, The Law of Evidence.111 As I pointed out in my prior
article, he contrasted Marian examinations to the crossexamination rule that applied in non-Marian depositions in a
passage regarding the implications of the 1696 ruling in King
v. Paine112 by writing that the judges in that misdemeanor libel
trial “would not allow the Examinations . . . to be given in
Evidence, because Paine was not present to cross-examine
[when the deposition at issue was taken], and tho’ tis Evidence
in Indictments for Felony in such Case, by Force of [the Marian
statutes],
yet
‘tis
not
so
in
Informations
for
In other words, a Marian witness
Misdemeanors . . . .”113
examination was admissible as “Evidence” in a felony trial
regardless of cross-examination, but a deposition was
(manual published anonymously but attributed to Judge Grimke; see Davies, supra
note 2 at 185 n.256); THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 145-47 (printed by Hugh Gaine, N.Y.
1788) [hereinafter GAINE’S CONDUCTOR]; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 177-78 (printed for
Robert Hodge, N.Y. 1788) [hereinafter HODGE’S CONDUCTOR]; ELIPHALET LADD, BURN’S
ABRIDGMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 156-58 (Dover, N.H. 1792) (reprinting Burn’s
discussion of Marian procedure; however, this manual omits all forms). The other
American manuals that did not track Burn as closely also included his forms for
examination of a witness and for a material witness warrant. See RICHARD STARKE,
THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 116 (Williamsburg 1774) (forms for
“Information of A Witness” and “Summon For [Material] Witness”); JAMES DAVIS, THE
OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 159 (New Bern, N.C. 1774) (“Summons
for a Witness Against a Felon,” followed by a passage on the authority of a justice
under the Marian statutes).
111
GILBERT, supra note 15.
112
See infra notes 125, 127-41 and accompanying text.
113
GILBERT, supra note 15, at 100 (1754 ed.) (emphasis added); id. at 139
(1777 ed.) (emphasis added), quoted in Davies, supra note 2, at 145.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia cited this passage for the point that Marian
examinations of unavailable witnesses were “admissible only ‘by Force “of the [Marian]
Statute,”’” but he omitted the contrasting “though” aspect of the statement. Crawford,
541 U.S. at 46.
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inadmissible in a misdemeanor trial (to which the Marian
statutes did not apply) unless the defendant had had an
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. That statement
appeared in later editions, including the 1788 American edition
of Gilbert’s treatise, and was still unaltered as late as the
expanded and updated 1791 London edition.114
Gilbert also implicitly drew a contrast between civil
lawsuit depositions and Marian witness examinations when he
explicitly noted that an opportunity for cross-examination was
required in the former, but made no comparable statement
about the latter.115 Gilbert’s contrasting treatment was also
echoed in later works.
b. The Theory of Evidence
Another evidence treatise, The Theory of Evidence, was
published anonymously in London in 1761.116 This treatise
stated that a deposition could be admitted into evidence in a
variety of civil proceedings if, but only if, the other party had
been given an opportunity to cross-examine when the
deposition was taken. However, when this treatise discussed
the admissibility in felony trials of Marian witness
examinations taken by coroners or justices of the peace, it
simply stated that Marian witness examinations could be
admitted in evidence if the witness had become unavailable.
The contrasting treatment is especially evident because this
treatise connected these two subjects with the disjunctive “yet”:
It is a general Rule, that Depositions taken in a Court not of Record
shall not be allowed in Evidence elsewhere. So it has been holden in
Regard to Depositions in the Ecclesiastical Court, though the
Witnesses were dead.
So where there cannot be a cross
Examination, as Depositions taken before Commissioners of
Bankrupts, they shall not be read in Evidence, yet if the Witnesses
examined on a Coroner’s Inquest are dead, or beyond Sea, their
Depositions may be read; for the Coroner is an Officer appointed on
behalf of the Public, to make Inquiry about the Matters within his
Jurisdiction; and therefore the Law will presume the Depositions

114

Davies, supra note 2, at 145-46.
Compare GILBERT, supra note 15, at 46-47, 48 (1754 ed.) (indicating that
an opportunity for cross-examination was a requirement for a deposition in civil
lawsuits), with id. at 100 (1754 ed.) (not mentioning cross-examination regarding
Marian examinations).
116
HENRY BATHURST, THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE (Dublin 1761). There was no
later edition of this work, which, though originally published anonymously, is now
attributed to Henry Bathurst. See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 378.
115
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before him to be fairly and impartially taken.—And by [the Marian
statutes] Justices of the Peace shall examine of Persons brought
before them for Felony, and of those who brought them, and certify
such Examination to the next Gaol-Delivery; but the Examination of
the Prisoner shall be without Oath, and the others upon Oath, and
these Examinations shall be read against the Offender upon an
Indictment, if the Witnesses be dead.117

The contents of The Theory of Evidence, including the
above passage, were subsequently restated in a 1767 treatise,
An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius,118
which I quoted in my previous article.119 The quoted passage
then appeared in later editions of the Nisi Prius treatise that
were published as late as 1793, including a New York edition
published in 1788.120
c. Burn’s Justice of the Peace Manual
Burn’s leading English justice of the peace manual
similarly contrasted Marian examinations in felony
prosecutions with depositions in civil lawsuits. In addition to
the description of Marian procedure noted above,121 Burn also
discussed the admissibility of depositions in civil proceedings
and the admissibility of Marian witness examinations of
unavailable witnesses in a subpart of his entry for “Evidence”
headed “Of written evidence.” In that discussion, Burn also
contrasted the rule that an opportunity for cross-examination
was a condition for admitting a deposition in a civil lawsuit to
the admissibility of Marian witness examinations of
unavailable witnesses.

117
BATHURST, supra note 116, at 33-34 (emphasis added). Kry concedes that
the “yet” in the quoted passage “arguably” applies to Marian committal examinations
as well as to coroners’ examinations, but suggests that it might apply only to coroners’
examinations. See Kry, supra note 3, at 500 n.28.
118
HENRY BATHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT
NISI PRIUS (n.p. 1767). The incorporation of the contents of The Theory of Evidence into
the Nisi Prius treatise and other later treatises was well known. See BRIDGMAN, supra
note 105, at 230-31 (noting that the contents of The Theory of Evidence were “generally
understood to have been engrafted on” the Nisi Prius treatise); 1 MAXWELL, supra note
4, at 378 (entry 1) (The Theory of Evidence incorporated into An Introduction to the
Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius); 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 335 (attributing the
1767 edition of the Nisi Prius treatise—first published anonymously—to Henry
Bathurst and the 1772 edition to Francis Buller).
119
Davies, supra note 2, at 151 n.148 (quoting the passage in the text
immediately after the “yet” cited supra text accompanying note 117).
120
Davies, supra note 2, at 151 n.147.
121
See supra text accompanying note 106.
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Beginning in the 1764 edition of his manual, Burn
apparently combined the statements about the requirement of
cross-examination in depositions in civil proceedings that
preceded the “yet” in the passage from The Theory of Evidence,
with the sections from Hawkins’s criminal procedure treatise
that discussed the admissibility of a Marian witness
examination of an unavailable witness in a felony trial. Burn
joined these two subjects with the disjunctive “but”:
So [in civil matters] where there cannot be a cross-examination, as
depositions taken before commissioners of bankrupts, they shall not
be read in evidence.
But it seems to be settled, that [a Marian examination of an
unavailable witness] may be given in evidence at the [felony]
trial . . . .122

Thus, Burn’s passage seems to indicate that cross-examination
was a condition for the admission of depositions in the trial of
civil lawsuits, “[b]ut” that it was not a requirement for the
admission of Marian witness examinations in felony trials.
The contrasting treatment of these subjects in Burn’s
manual is especially important because the passage quoted
above was reprinted in several framing-era American justice of
Other American manuals simply
the peace journals.123
discussed the admissibility of a Marian examination of an
unavailable witness separately from the admissibility of civil
depositions.124 None mentioned either the presence of the
prisoner or an opportunity for cross-examination as conditions
for admitting a Marian examination of an unavailable witness.
3. Summary
The bottom line is that there were no statements in the
framing-era authorities widely used in England and America—
including the justice of the peace manuals that were intended
122
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 336 (1764 ed.). Note that the material
preceding “but” came from The Theory of Evidence, BATHURST, supra note 116, at 34,
while the material following “but” came from Hawkins’s treatise, 2 HAWKINS, supra
note 4, at 429 (1771 ed.). The same passage is repeated in subsequent editions of
Burn’s manual. See, e.g., 1 id. at 516 (1785 ed.); 1 id. at 645 (1797 ed.).
123
See, e.g., GREENLEAF, supra note 110, at 118; GRIMKE, supra note 110, at
184; LADD, supra note 110, at 131-32. See Davies, supra note 2, at 182-86.
124
HODGE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 168 (discussing the admissibility
of Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses before very briefly touching on the
admissibility of civil depositions); GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 137-38
(same).
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to inform the very officials who administered Marian
examinations—that stated any in-the-presence or crossexamination rule applicable to Marian witness examinations.
Rather, the treatises and justice of the peace manuals
contrasted the cross-examination standard for civil depositions
to the absence of such a rule for Marian witness examinations.
Nevertheless, Kry discounts the published framing-era
authorities that almost certainly informed the American
Framers’ understanding of Marian procedure. Instead, he
discusses English sources and practices that either could not
have informed the Framers’ thinking, or were unlikely to have
done so. Let me turn to these sources and practices.
C.

Kry’s Pre-Framing Evidence for an In-the-Presence
Practice

Like Crawford, Kry relies heavily on reports of two 1696
cases. He also goes beyond Crawford by describing Marian
practices in eighteenth-century London, and then invokes the
same three English cases from 1787, 1789, and 1791 that
Crawford heavily relied upon—that is, the three cases that
were published too late to have come to the Framers’ attention.
I continue to doubt that any of this sheds much light on the
original American understanding of the Confrontation Clause.
1. The 1696 Sources
Both Crawford and Kry rely heavily upon statements in
two 1696 proceedings, the misdemeanor libel trial in King v.
Paine,125 and a single colloquy in the attainder proceeding for
treason in Parliament in Fenwick’s Case.126 The first said
nothing material, while the second was too obscure to have
mattered.
a. Paine
Kry says that the 1696 ruling in Paine is “Professor
Davies’ other line of authority.”127 That is an odd way to put it.
Justice Scalia asserted in Crawford that Paine had created an
125

5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696), discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S.

at 45-46.
126
127

13 How. St. Tr. 537 (H.C. 1696), discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-46.
Kry, supra note 3, at 505.
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across-the-board common-law cross-examination rule.128 I only
responded, in criticizing that claim, that Justice Scalia had
ignored the fundamental point that Marian procedure applied
only to felony prosecutions, not to misdemeanor prosecutions.129
Thus, the ruling in the misdemeanor trial in Paine was not
about Marian witness examinations. Instead, because all five
of the reports of Paine explicitly indicated that the ruling in
that case did not affect the admissibility of a Marian witness
examination, and seemed to affirm the admissibility of Marian
examinations of absent witnesses, I concluded that Paine could
not have stated a general cross-examination rule.130 I also
noted that the discussions of Paine that appeared in the
framing-era treatises drew the same distinction between the
deposition in that misdemeanor prosecution and Marian
procedure in felonies.131 Hence, regardless of how one might
tease out what Paine meant about the admissibility of nonMarian depositions in misdemeanor cases, there is no reason to
think that a framing-era American would have viewed Paine as
an authority that had any bearing on the admissibility of a
Marian witness examination in a felony trial.
Indeed, as noted above, Gilbert (who was a
contemporary of the Paine ruling132) actually contrasted the
inadmissibility of the deposition in that misdemeanor case with
the admissibility of Marian examinations in felony trials when
he wrote: “[T]ho’ tis Evidence in Indictments for Felony in such
case by Force of [the Marian statutes], yet ‘tis not so in
Informations for Misdemeanors.”133 Kry concedes that the
“more natural[]” reading of this passage is that crossexamination was not a condition for admitting Marian
depositions in felony trials,134 and that a similar interpretation
128

541 U.S. at 45, 46.
See Davies, supra note 2, at 135-43. After reading Kry’s article, I wonder if
I unnecessarily muddied the waters by speculating what Paine meant regarding the
use of depositions in misdemeanor cases. See id. at 137-40. That really was beside the
more basic point that Paine did not raise any doubt about the admissibility in a felony
trial of a Marian witness examination of an unavailable witness. See id. at 140-42
(noting that all four versions of Paine that appear in the five reports indicated that the
ruling against the admissibility of the deposition in the misdemeanor prosecution “had
no effect on the rule that Marian [examinations] of unavailable witnesses were
admissible in felony trials”).
130
Id. at 140-43. See also supra note 40.
131
Davies, supra note 2, at 143-49.
132
Gilbert died in 1726. BRIDGMAN, supra note 105, at 132.
133
See supra text accompanying note 113.
134
Kry, supra note 3, at 510-11.
129
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of Paine is also evident in English decisions announced in 1739
and 1790.135 It seems likely that framing-era Americans also
understood the “more natural[]” reading of Gilbert’s statement.
Nevertheless, Kry insists that Paine may have said
something about Marian examinations. Although he concedes
that the case is “ambiguous on its face,” Kry places weight on a
variety of post-framing constructions of the case in English
commentaries published in 1814 and 1816136 and on statements
about Paine in American state cases decided in 1835, 1842, and
1844.137 On the basis of these post-framing constructions, he
concludes that Crawford’s “interpretation [of Paine] cannot be
dismissed as ‘fictional’ when that same interpretation was
ultimately adopted as settled law.”138 I disagree.
As I discuss below, legal historians have long recognized
that commentators and judges frequently shoehorn old cases
into new conceptions without admitting as much.139 Indeed,
Kry effectively concedes that Paine could not have been
understood to create a cross-examination rule for Marian
felony examinations during the eighteenth century when he
concludes that there was only an “emerging consensus”
regarding an in-the-presence rule “by the time of the framing”
while a cross-examination rule was still a matter “of dispute”
and emerged only “at some [later] point.”140 Hence, Paine
plainly was not regarded as having created a cross-examination
rule for Marian examinations during the eighteenth century.
Rather, that gloss was applied only after the 1789 framing.
The fact that later nineteenth-century English
commentators and American judges subsequently “widely read”
Paine so that it fit then-prevailing conceptions141 simply does
not constitute evidence that Paine would have been understood
that way in framing-era America. Nineteenth-century judicial
interpretations of earlier cases can be every bit as fictional as
contemporary judicial interpretations of prior doctrines. The
135

Id. at 511 n.78 (discussing King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach 12, 12, 168 Eng. Rep.
108, 109 (K.B. 1789), and King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 82324 (K.B. 1790)).
136
Id. at 511.
137
Id. at 509.
138
Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
139
See infra text accompanying notes 309-10. See also supra note 26
(discussing unacknowledged judicial relaxation of arrest standard); infra notes 317-19
and accompanying text (discussing unacknowledged judicial invention of hearsay
exceptions).
140
See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
141
Kry, supra note 3, at 511.
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important fact is that framing-era authorities consistently
described Paine as simply indicating that Marian witness
examinations constituted a distinct form of evidence subject to
distinct rules.
b. Fenwick
Like Justice Scalia in Crawford, Kry also asserts that a
colloquy that occurred during the 1696 attainder proceeding for
treason in Fenwick indicated that Marian depositions had to be
taken in the presence of the party.142 However, the mere fact
that a statement was made sometime prior to the framing does
not mean that framing-era Americans would have been
familiar with the statement. One can safely assume that
framing-era American lawyers and judges consulted the
leading legal treatises and manuals. Conversely, it seems
doubtful that they would have been conversant with the details
of English treason trials or attainder proceedings that were
reported at length in the State Trials case reports. Thus, I
dismissed the Fenwick colloquy because it seemed improbable
that the Framers would have been conversant with it.143
Kry insists that I dismissed the Fenwick colloquy too
quickly. He asserts that “[s]everal colonial libraries had copies
of the State Trials,” that modern “scholars have assumed the
Framers were familiar with their contents,” and that both
Blackstone and Hawkins “discussed and cited” Fenwick.144
Really?
Access to the State Trials set of reports, as well as to
other specific sets of English case reports, was problematic in
framing-era America. Law libraries were still privately owned,
not public. Moreover, the State Trials set of reports was a
multi-volume collection that grew from four volumes in 1719 to
eleven in the fourth edition published over the period 1776-

142

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-46; Kry, supra note 3, at 501.
Cf. Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 209 (2005) (questioning the relevance of English treason trials to
the American confrontation right). The ready availability of Howell’s 1816 edition of
State Trials, complete with a comprehensive subject index, in modern law libraries
may lead contemporary academics, lawyers, and judges to place undue emphasis on the
State Trials as evidence of original meaning. For an early example of a false originalist
claim based on Howell’s edition, see Davies, Fourth Amendment, supra note 20, at 72627 (discussing Justice Bradley’s mistaken reliance on a report in State Trials for a
novel claim in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
144
Kry, supra note 3, at 502 (emphasis added).
143
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1781.145 It was also an expensive set of reports.146 Hence,
because it is unclear that reports of treason trials or attainder
proceedings in Parliament would have been of much practical
value for American lawyers or judges, especially after 1775, it
seems doubtful that many Americans obtained these reports
prior to the framing.
Moreover, even if one had access to the set, finding
material regarding a particular procedural point in the
multiple volumes of the State Trials reports was no small feat
because the indexes in the pre-framing editions were very
Reading these accounts was also no small
limited.147
undertaking; Fenwick’s attainder proceeding ran to ninety-six
double-columned pages in the 1719 folio (large page) edition.148
What about the references to Fenwick in Blackstone’s
and Hawkins’s treatises that Kry refers to? They did mention
Fenwick by name—but not for the point that was germane to
the claim made by Kry or in Crawford. Because the English
treason statutes required evidence of two witnesses for overt
acts of treason, but the prosecutors could produce only one
145
See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 369 (indicating that State Trials consisted
of four volumes in the 1719 first edition, six in 1730, eight in 1735, ten in 1766, and
eleven in Hargrave’s edition published over the period 1776-1781). No further edition
was published until Howell’s edition, published 1809-1826. Id. at 370.
146
See BRIDGMAN, supra note 105, at 312-13 (commenting that Hargrave
undertook to republish the set in eleven volumes in 1776 because “this work ha[d]
become very scarce, and s[old] at a high price”). It may also be significant that
Hargrave’s later edition was published during the years 1776-1781, the years of the
Revolutionary War. See supra note 145.
147
There were four eighteenth-century editions of State Trials (or Tryals); the
first folio edition in 1719, a second edition in 1730, a third in 1742, and Francis
Hargrave’s fourth edition in 1776-1781. See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 369. Each
edition had an alphabetical topical index at the end of the final volume (none of the
indexes had numbered pages). However, the indexes were quite superficial. In all of
the editions, the entries for “Depositions” and “Examination” refer the reader to the
entry for “Evidence.” In the “Evidence” entry, each of the indexes had a subentry for
“Depositions of a Person absent read in Evidence in a capital Case” and each also had a
subentry for the specific point in Fenwick that “No Evidence to be given in capital
Cases but in the Prisoner’s Presence,” identifying the page discussing the presentation
of evidence at trial, as discussed infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing
Hawkins’s citation to page “277”). However, none of the “Evidence” entries in the
alphabetical tables had a subentry that led to the colloquy regarding the deposition of a
witness having been taken in the absence of the defendant that Mr. Kry and Justice
Scalia rely upon. Thus, a framing-era reader would not have identified Fenwick as a
case discussing that point by using the indexes.
It is easy to overlook these deficiencies when doing research today, because
Howell’s nineteenth-century edition of State Trials that is now commonly found on law
library shelves does have a useful comprehensive subject index in which the colloquy in
Fenwick can be identified—but that is only a post-framing development.
148
See The Tryal of Sir John Fenwick, 4 St. Tr. (1719 ed.) 232, 232-328 (H.C.
1696).
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living witness against Fenwick, they could not prosecute him
for treason in the law courts. Instead, he was prosecuted in an
attainder proceeding in Parliament, where the admission of
evidence was decided by vote. Fenwick was convicted on the
basis of one live witness and one deposition of another person.
Thus, Blackstone and Hawkins both discussed Fenwick simply
as a departure from the two-witness treason standard—but
neither discussed the point that the deposition in question was
taken in Fenwick’s absence.
Blackstone did not mention a deposition at all. He
wrote only that “in Sir John Fenwick’s case, in king William’s
time, where there was but one witness, an act of parliament
was made on purpose to attaint him of treason, and he was
executed.”149 Hawkins also discussed Fenwick simply as a
departure from the two-witness rule. He mentioned that a
deposition of a witness taken by a justice of the peace had been
used as a substitute for a second live witness, but said nothing
about whether the deposition was taken in the presence or
absence of the prisoner.150 Thus, neither Blackstone’s nor
Hawkins’s passage would have alerted a framing-era American
that the requisites of valid Marian examinations were
discussed in Fenwick.151 That said, however, I concede that Kry
149
150

4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 351 (1st ed. 1769).
Hawkins wrote:

[I]t was agreed in Sir John Fenwick’s Case, that the Information of a Witness
taken upon Oath before a Justice of Peace, being joined with the Evidence of
one other Witness only viva voce, could not in the ordinary Course of Justice,
amount to sufficient Evidence within the [treason statute] which requires two
Witnesses in High Treason; and therefore it was thought necessary to proceed
in that Case by Bill of Attainder in Parliament, whose Power can be
restrained by no Rules but those of natural Justice.
2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 430 (1771 ed.) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); 2
LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 606 (1787 ed.) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
151
Like Blackstone and Hawkins, Capel Lofft also did not mention that
Fenwick was absent when the deposition was taken when Lofft added a discussion of
Fenwick to Gilbert’s evidence treatise in 1791. 2 GILBERT, supra note 15, at 895-97
(Capel Lofft ed., 1791) (discussing evidence in attainder proceedings in Parliament).
Lofft commented that the admission of a deposition of an “absent Witness” as evidence
during Fenwick’s attainder trial in Parliament deprived Fenwick of meeting the
witness “face to face” and of “cross-examining” the witness. However, he did not
mention Fenwick’s absence when the deposition was taken. Id. at 897.
Thus, the important point about Dean Wigmore’s claim, which Justice
Scalia quoted in Crawford, that Fenwick “‘must have burned into the general
consciousness the vital importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination,’”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (quoting 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (2d ed.
1923)), is that the salient abuse associated with Fenwick in the accounts by Blackstone,
Hawkins, and Lofft was the admission of a deposition of a witness who was merely
absent from a trial rather than dead, and the associated loss of Fenwick’s opportunity
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does identify a citation to Fenwick in Hawkins’s treatise that I
overlooked, and it bears closer attention.
c. Hawkins’s Margin Citation to “4 State
Trials . . . 310”
At the outset of Hawkins’s chapter on evidence in
criminal cases, he wrote: “As to the nature of evidence, so far as
it more particularly concerns criminal cases, having premised
that it is a settled rule, That in cases of life no evidence is to be
given against a prisoner but in his presence . . . .”152 When I
read this passage, I assumed it referred simply to the
“evidence” admitted at a felony trial. I assumed this because
framing-era sources typically used the term “evidence” to refer
to the proof offered at trial; hence, Marian witness
examinations were not usually denoted as “evidence” unless
they were admitted at trial. I did not notice that a citation in
the margin next to the quoted passage (the eighteenth-century
equivalent of a footnote) to “State Trials vol. 4 f. 277. 310” was
a citation to Fenwick.153
The statements on page 277 do relate to presenting
evidence in the prisoner’s presence at trial.154 However, page
310 includes an argument that a witness’s deposition should
have been taken in the prisoner’s presence. Specifically, there
is an argument against the validity of “a Deposition of a Person
that was absent [from trial], taken before a Justice of the
Peace, when the Person accused, had no opportunity to
interrogate him.”155 This argument was not successful; the
to cross-examine the witnesses against him during Fenwick’s attainder trial itself. In
contrast, none of those accounts mentioned Fenwick’s absence when the deposition at
issue was taken.
152
2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 428 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra
note 4, at 602 (1787 ed.) (citation omitted). Of course, this passage presents serious
problems for Justice Scalia’s other originalist claim in Crawford to the effect that the
Framers would not have objected to the admission in criminal trials of unsworn out-ofcourt statements involving “nontestimonial hearsay.” See Davies, Not the Framers’
Design, supra note 17.
153
2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 428 n.(a) (1721 ed.), cited in Kry, supra note 3,
at 502 n.38. Hawkins’s margin citation did not refer to Fenwick by name.
154
The Tryal of Sir John Fenwick, 4 St. Tr. (1719 ed.) 232, 277 (H.C. 1696)
(referring to the “Evidence” that was introduced when a man was “upon Tryal for his
Life”).
155
Sir Christopher Musgrave, speaking on Fenwick’s behalf during the
attainder proceeding in the House of Commons, argued as follows:
It now will appear upon your Journals that you have caused to be read, a
Deposition of a Person that was absent, taken before a Justice of Peace, when
the Person accused, had no opportunity to interrogate him; and likewise that
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House of Commons voted to admit the deposition, and also
voted to condemn Fenwick.156
What is the significance of Hawkins’s margin citation to
page 310? The cited passage in Fenwick does not refer to
Marian authority as such.157 Moreover, it seems unlikely that
Hawkins meant to indicate that it was settled law that Marian
witness examinations had to be conducted in the presence of
the prisoner, because Hawkins had not mentioned any such
requirement in the earlier sections of his treatise that had
discussed Marian procedure itself.158 Hence, it seems doubtful
that the margin citation to page 310 in the report of Fenwick
was meant to indicate that Marian witness examinations had
to be taken in the presence of the arrestee.
Additionally, whatever Hawkins intended, there are
reasons to discount the likelihood that Americans would have
noticed the margin citation to Fenwick.
For one thing,
assessing the meaning of the margin citation was problematic
insofar as it required access to the 1719 folio edition of State
Trials reports—the page cite does not work for the later
you have heard a Witness as to what a Man swore in the Tryal of another
Man: All this will appear upon your Books.
And truly, I would be glad to know if another Age may not be apt to think
that you took these to make good the Defect of another Witness; and then I
must appeal to you, if you have not admitted of a Testimony, which according
to no Law is admitted.
They say you are not tied to the Rules of Westminster-Hall [the common-law
courts], nor their Forms: Is there any Law in Being, that says a Judge may
hear a Witness as to what was sworn upon the Tryal of another Person, to
condemn him that was not Party to that Tryal. If there be no such Law, then
the Rule is founded upon Justice and common Right, that nothing shall be
brought against a Man when a Man was not a Party when the Oath was
made, and he had no Opportunity to examine him.
Id. at 310. Note that Justice Scalia did not cite this passage in Crawford; rather, he
cited a colloquy that Hawkins did not cite. 541 U.S. at 45-46.
156
Fenwick, 4 St. Tr. at 310, 327.
157
Hawkins discussed the admission of depositions in treason cases in a
subsequent section to his discussion of the admissibility of Marian witness
examinations. That latter section does not mention the Marian statutes (which did not
apply to treason as such). The passage on depositions focused on the inadmissibility of
depositions of available witnesses who could have been produced in person. See 2
HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429-30 (1771 ed.) (Sections 6 and 9); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS,
supra note 4, at 605 (1787 ed.) (same).
158
Hawkins’s “premise[]” appeared in volume 2, chapter 46, 2 HAWKINS, supra
note 4, at 428 (1771 ed.), but his discussions of Marian coroners’ examinations, bail
procedure, and committal procedure were in volume 2, chapters 9, 15, and 16, id. at 49,
104-05, 118-19. See also supra note 99 and accompanying text. Hence, there was no
indication in Hawkins’s treatise itself that the in-the-presence premise applied to
Marian procedure.
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editions. In fact, unless one has access to the 1719 edition, one
cannot even identify the citation as one to Fenwick (Hawkins
cited only the pages, not the case name). Perhaps because of
the limited usefulness of Hawkins’s citation, the framing-era
justice of the peace manuals did not repeat Hawkins’s page
cites to Fenwick.
Burn’s leading English justice of the peace manual
repeated Hawkins’s “premise[]” that evidence be taken in the
presence of the prisoner, but not in either of the entries that
discussed Marian examinations. Rather, Burn quoted that
passage only in a later part of his entry on “Evidence” under
the heading “Of the manner of giving evidence” which related to
testimony at trial, and he omitted Hawkins’s margin citation to
Fenwick.159
Framing-era American justice of the peace manuals
followed Burn’s presentation of Hawkins’s in-the-presence
premise—they also quoted Hawkins’s passage in the discussion
of trial testimony without the margin citation to Fenwick.160
Hence, it seems unlikely that Hawkins’s margin citation would
have alerted American readers to the colloquy in Fenwick that
was cited in Crawford.
In sum, it does not appear that either Paine or Fenwick
would have led framing-era Americans to think that Marian
procedure involved either an in-the-presence or crossexamination rule. What about English practice?
2. Eighteenth-Century English Practice
After discussing the 1696 sources, Kry turns to English
Marian practice during the eighteenth century. Although the
English historian James Fitzjames Stephen previously
reported that the prisoner was not present during Marian
witness examinations,161 and Justice Scalia endorsed that
159
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 293-94 (1755 ed.) (quoting Hawkins’s passage
but citing only “2 Haw. 248”); 1 id. at 533 (1785 ed.) (same); 1 id. at 668 (1797 ed.)
(same).
160
See, e.g., GREENLEAF, supra note 110, at 128 (quoting Hawkins’s text but
citing only “2 Haw. 428.”); GRIMKE, supra note 110, at 197 (same); HODGE’S
CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 174 (same); GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at
144 (same); LADD, supra note 110, at 154 (same).
161
1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 221 (London, MacMillan 1883) (“The prisoner had no right to be, and
probably never was, present [at a Marian witness examination].”). I mentioned
Stephen’s assertion in my 2005 article but pointed out that he had presented no
evidence to support it. See Davies, supra note 2, at 170.
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account prior to Crawford,162 Kry indicates that Stephen’s
account was erroneous.163 He reports that recent historical
research, especially that by Professor John Beattie, has
disclosed that during the eighteenth century, prisoners were
routinely present for Marian examinations in London.164 Kry
first argues that Marian witness examinations were routinely
taken in the presence of the arrestee.165 He reports that “more
than 80%” of a small sample of twenty-seven London Marian
witness examinations from 1789 clearly reveal that the
arrestee was present, and Kry interprets this to mean that the
presence of the arrestee was a “near-universal” feature of
London Marian procedure166 (though Kry concedes that these
Marian examinations “provide little evidence of crossexamination”167).
I do not intend to quarrel with Kry’s general description
of the evolution of English Marian practice, which seems
plausible. Rather, I identify three objections to treating Kry’s
description of English practice as though it were evidence of
the original American understanding of the confrontation right:
First, a routine practice is hardly the same as a legal rule,
requirement, or right, and Kry does not establish that the
routine practice became a legal rule or right even in England
prior to the framing of the Confrontation Clause in 1789.
Second, there is no basis to assume that English Marian
practice—indeed, London practice—provides a window on
American Marian practice. And third, Kry does not provide a
plausible explanation as to how framing-era Americans would
have been aware of English Marian practice in the absence of
published accounts of that practice.
The important question regarding original meaning is
not what English Marian practice was, but how framing-era
Americans understood Marian procedure.
The work of
contemporary historians of English criminal justice is certainly
162
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“‘The prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present’ [at a Marian
witness examination].” (quoting 1 STEPHEN, supra note 161, at 221)). Justice Scalia
joined Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion. Id. at 358. Stephen’s claim is not repeated
in Crawford. However, neither is there a statement in Crawford that earlier reliance
on that claim was misplaced.
163
See Kry, supra note 3, at 516.
164
Id. at 516 n.93, 527-28, 531.
165
Id. at 512-16.
166
Id. at 514-16.
167
Id. at 535.
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interesting in its own right, but it does not illuminate the
original American understanding of the confrontation right.
3. “Routine” Practices Do Not Constitute Legal Rules
Although Kry at one point asserts that the prisoner
would “necessarily” be present for Marian witness
examinations,168 he usually describes English practice in terms
of what was “routinely” or “almost invariably” done.169 For
example, he states that “Marian examinations [in England]
were routinely conducted in the prisoner’s presence[,] . . . [and]
by the framing, there was an emerging consensus that presence
was also a procedural right.”170 However, “routinely” and
“emerging consensus” do not connote a settled legal rule,
requirement, or right.171 Kry labels the practice he describes as
a “procedural right,” but that is merely his own label; he does
not identify any authoritative statement of such a “right” even
in English law prior to 1789.
It may well be that the arrestee was often present,
especially in London, when Marian witness examinations were
taken. That practice, in turn, may have spawned an issue as to
whether an arrestee should have a right to be present at such
examinations. However, the only reference to the prisoner’s
presence at Marian examinations that I have located in any
English publication that Americans could have been aware of
at the time of the framing merely posed a query as to whether a
Marian examination should be admissible if the defendant was
not present when it was taken.172 That query would seem to
168

Id. at 523.
See, e.g., Kry, supra note 3, at 495 (defendant “routinely present”); id. at
516 (defendant “almost invariably present” in London Marian procedure).
170
Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
171
Although Kry indicates that the arrestee initially had no right to be
present for the Marian examinations of witnesses, id. at 516 n.93, he quotes modern
studies of English criminal procedure to the effect that presence and a crossexamination requirement were accepted “in its most general terms” in London “by 1790
or soon thereafter” or by “the end of the eighteenth century.” Id. at 542 n.225.
However, the significant point for the present inquiry is that none of those studies
assert any legal rules to those effects by 1789.
172
See 4 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 671 (9th ed.
1763) (stating, regarding Marian witness examinations, “that they may be read [if it is
proved the witness is dead, or unable to travel, or kept away by the Prisoner]; but Qu.
If the Defendant must not be present at the Time they are taken in order to make them
good Evidence.” (“Qu.” being an abbreviation of “Quare” or “Query”)).
The
“Advertisement” in the material at the front of this edition indicates that it was revised
by “an eminent Barrister.” No query appeared in the previous edition. See 4 id. at
676-77 (8th ed. 1754). The query was repeated without change in the tenth edition
169
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confirm that there was no recognized in-the-presence “rule.” It
would also seem to confirm that neither of the 1696 rulings in
Paine or Fenwick had created any such “rule.”
Indeed, there is a glaringly large gap in the English
legal authorities that Kry construes as evidence of an in-thepresence rule. Kry does not cite any such authority after the
two 1696 sources discussed above until the 1787 ruling in King
v. Radbourne,173 the earliest of the three cases that Justice
Scalia relied heavily upon in Crawford.174 That gap strongly
suggests that no in-the-presence rule or right was recognized in
English Marian procedure during the eighteenth century.
Moreover, it is not that clear what Radbourne stands for.
a. The 1787 Ruling in Radbourne
In the 1787 Radbourne case, a justice of the peace’s
examination of a murder victim prior to her death was
admitted in a trial in the Old Bailey, notwithstanding that it
did not constitute a dying declaration, and notwithstanding
that it was not taken in connection with Radbourne’s arrest.175
The Twelve Judges then upheld that ruling. Radbourne was
present for something in connection with the victim’s
examination, but exactly what she was present for is uncertain
because there are two different versions of the case report.176
(described in the “Advertisement” as having been revised by “a Serjeant at Law”). See
4 id. at 642 (10th ed. 1772). However, that was the last edition published. See 1
MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 38.
Some of the relevant editions of Wood’s Institutes were imported by
Americans, though apparently not in large numbers. A search of the online catalogs of
public libraries in the United States reveals twenty-five copies of the 1763 edition and
nineteen of the 1772 edition. I am indebted to my colleague Professor Sibyl Marshall
for this information.
173
The description of the evidentiary issue in Radbourne varies depending on
which edition of Leach’s reports is consulted, as discussed in the text infra Part
IV.C.3.a.
174
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47 (citing King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed.
1815) 457, 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-32 (Old Bailey 1787)).
175
The victim’s examination in Radbourne was not a dying declaration
because, at the time, the victim did not appreciate that she was dying. Additionally,
the examination does not appear to have been taken in connection with Radbourne’s
arrest or committal. The initial report lends that impression because it mentions that
the victim’s examination was taken during the interval of several weeks that she
lingered after the attack. Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) 399, 400 (Old Bailey and
Twelve Judges 1787) [the first page is misnumbered “993”]. (According to the later
1800 version, the crime was committed on May 31st, but the examination was taken on
June 9th. Radbourne, Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 459, 168 Eng. Rep. at 331.)
176
Like everyone else, when I wrote my 2005 article on Crawford, I
erroneously assumed that the reports of Radbourne in the various editions of Leach
would be the same. However, Professor Robert Mosteller subsequently called my
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A short report of Radbourne was initially published in
the first edition of Thomas Leach’s Cases in Crown Law in
1789177 (though too late to have come to the American Framers’
attention178). That version was reprinted, with only a small
However, the
change, in Leach’s 1792 second edition.179
Radbourne report was substantially enlarged and altered in
Leach’s 1800 third edition.180 This later version was then
reprinted in Leach’s 1815 fourth edition, which is now
reprinted in the English Reports.181 Thus, the version of
Radbourne cited in Crawford was not actually published until
1800.182
There are several significant differences between the
initial report and the 1800 version. One difference is that the
1789 report never mentioned the Marian statutes, but the 1800
version did.183 Hence, it is not altogether clear that Radbourne
addressed a Marian witness examination at all, particularly
because the examination in Radbourne does not seem to have
attention to differing versions of another case in the various editions of Leach. Thus, I
examined the Radbourne case report in the first edition of Leach’s reports and
discovered the difference. I also found the enlarged version in the 1800 third edition.
However, I could not locate a copy of the second edition. When I brought the
differences to Mr. Kry’s attention, he succeeded in locating a copy of the second edition,
and I am indebted to him for a copy of the relevant pages from the second edition.
177
Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 399.
178
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
179
Radbourne, Leach (2d ed. 1792) 363 (Old Bailey and Twelve Judges 1787).
The report in the second edition is the same as the first, except that the phrase “to [the
victim] in the presence and hearing of the prisoner” was italicized in the second edition.
Id. at 363.
180
Radbourne, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) 512 (Old Bailey and Twelve Judges
1787).
181
Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 (Old Bailey and
Twelve Judges 1787).
182
See supra note 13.
183
The 1800 version, reprinted in Leach’s 1815 edition and in the English
Reports, does quote the prosecutor William Garrow as saying that the victim’s
statement “was admissible as an information taken by a regular magistrate, under the
statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been given in the presence and hearing of the
prisoner, upon an oath lawfully administered.” Radbourne, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) at
518, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332.
In contrast, there is no mention of the Marian statutes in the initial report
of the case, which does not quote Garrow at all. See Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789)
399 (Old Bailey 1787). Moreover, the absence of any mention of the Marian statutes in
the first edition of Leach corresponds to the account of Garrow’s statement about the
examination in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey account of Radbourne, in which he
makes no mention of the Marian statutes, but seems to suggest that the victim’s
examination should be admissible because Radbourne’s failure to object to it when she
heard it was proof of her guilt. See Trial of Henrietta Radbourne (Old Bailey July
1787),
The
Proceedings
of
the
Old
Bailey,
Ref:
t17870711-1,
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ html_units/1780s/t17870711-1.html.
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been taken in the post-arrest window for Marian procedure
defined in the 1789 and 1791 cases.184 Radbourne’s relevance to
Marian procedure is also clouded because the defendant was
charged with petty treason as well as murder, and the treason
statutes, unlike the Marian statutes, explicitly required that
all evidence be taken in the presence of the prisoner.185
A second difference between the reports relates to
exactly what happened. The 1800 version that Justice Scalia
cited states that two magistrates “in the presence of the
prisoner, took down [the victim’s] deposition,” and “[t]he whole
of this examination . . . was heard by the prisoner,” and
“distinctly read over to her.”186 Likewise, Kry cites the 1800
version when he writes that the examination “was taken” in the
presence of the prisoner.187
However the initial report published in 1789 indicated
only that “[the victim] gave an information upon oath, before a
Justice of the Peace, which was read deliberately over to her in
the presence and hearing of the prisoner, then signed by her,
and authenticated by the magistrate.”188 The prosecuting
attorney is quoted even in the later version as saying only that
the examination was “given” in the prisoner’s presence,189 a

184
See infra note 197. There is a possibility that Thomas Leach may have
purposely added the reference to the Marian statutes in the 1800 version as part of a
campaign for a cross-examination rule. See infra note 191.
185
The defendant servant was charged with petty treason because the victim
was her mistress, and petty treason, as a form of treason, would have been subject to
the explicit requirement in the treason statutes, unlike the Marian statutes, that all
evidence be taken in the presence of the prisoner. See Davies, supra note 2, at 165.
186
Radbourne, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) at 516; 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 459, 168
Eng. Rep. at 331-32 (emphasis added).
187
Kry, supra note 3, at 517 & n.101.
188
Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 400 (emphasis added). The relevant
passage in the 1789 version read as follows:

The deceased survived for several weeks the blows and wounds which were
the cause of her death.
During this interval, and before she was
apprehensive of, or, from the evidence of the surgeon who attended her, had
any reason to apprehend her approaching dissolution, she gave an
information upon oath, before a Justice of the Peace, which was read
deliberately over to her in the presence and hearing of the prisoner, then
signed by her, and authenticated by the magistrate; and he was the only
subscribing witness to it. This information, being regularly proved, was
admitted in evidence against the prisoner [at trial] . . . .
Id.
189

1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 461, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332.
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somewhat ambiguous verb that also appears in the account in
the Proceedings of the Old Bailey.190
Although saying that an examination was “taken” in the
prisoner’s presence might imply some room for prisoner
participation, merely “reading” the already written-out record
of a witness examination in the presence of a defendant would
not. Whichever version is more accurate (which is not clear191),
the emphasis in both is on the defendant’s having “heard” the
examination; neither version indicates that Radbourne, the
defendant, was allowed an active role in the victim’s
examination.192 Thus, whatever Radbourne stood for, it did not
involve cross-examination. There is also more than a little

190

Trial of Henrietta Radbourne (Old Bailey July 1787), The Proceedings of
the Old Bailey, Ref: t17870711-1, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1780s/
t17870711-1.html. The report of Radbourne in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey
quotes prosecuting barrister William Garrow as stating that the victim’s examination
“was given in the presence of the prisoner; she heard it, she saw it sworn to, she saw
the deceased subscribe to it; and she heard her solemnly call God to witness, that it
was true,” and further, that the defendant revealed her guilt because she “did not
object to it when [she] heard it.” Id. Garrow’s verb “was given” is ambiguous because
it could refer either to the taking or reading of the examination. James Crofts, the
magistrate who administered the examination of the victim, said “the prisoner was
there at the time, and heard the whole of this account, it was afterwards distinctly read
over to the prisoner in the presence of [the victim], it was signed by [the victim].” Id.
191
Some of the changes between the initial report of Radbourne and the 1800
version suggest the possibility that Thomas Leach, who was not an official reporter,
may have been creatively campaigning for a cross-examination rule. For example, the
initial report used the more traditional term “examination” when referring to the
victim’s statement, while the 1800 version used the term “deposition,” which carried
the baggage that Marian examinations were not really sui generis. See supra note 80.
Likewise, it is curious that the change from “read” to “taken down” was not made
promptly in the 1792 second edition. Instead, Leach italicized the phrase “in the
presence and hearing of the prisoner” in that edition. Radbourne, Leach (2d ed. 1792)
at 363. Why did he add that emphasis? (One possibility is that it was a reaction to
Justice Buller’s 1790 comments in Eriswell, discussed infra text accompanying notes
223-27.) In addition, as discussed supra note 183, there was no mention of the Marian
statutes in the 1789 report of Radbourne, and there is also none in the account in the
Proceedings in the Old Bailey.
It may also be significant that Thomas Leach’s 1795 edition of Hawkins’s
treatise was the first commentary to assert that a Marian deposition of a deceased
witness was inadmissible unless it had been taken in the presence of the prisoner and
the prisoner had an opportunity to cross-examine. See 4 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note
4, at 423 (1795 ed.) (basing a new section on Woodcock and Dingler, but not mentioning
Radbourne). As Kry indicates, no other commentary seems to have mentioned “crossexamination” until 1816. See Kry, supra note 3, at 495 n.11. Leach seems to have been
a bit ahead of his time.
192
Justice Buller, who participated in the Twelve Judges’ review of
Radbourne, later made comments about Radbourne that seem to comport with the
examination only having being read in the prisoner’s presence. See infra text
accompanying note 223.
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uncertainty as to what the later 1789 case that Kry discusses
(and on which Crawford also heavily relied193) stood for.
b. The 1789 Ruling in Woodcock
The 1789 Old Bailey ruling in King v. Woodcock194
refused to admit the examination of a murder victim because
the examination was not taken in connection with the
defendant’s arrest. Unfortunately, the report never says
whether the defendant was arrested and committed before or
after the examination.195 The trial judge, Chief Baron Eyre
(the chief judge of the Court of Exchequer), stated that the
examination was not “of the nature” of a Marian examination
because “[i]t was not taken, as the statute directs, in a case
where the prisoner was brought before [the justice of the peace]
in custody; the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of
contradicting the facts it contains.” He went on to state that
the examination was not taken in the discharge of a justice of
the peace’s duty “by which he is, on hearing the witnesses, to
bail or commit the prisoner; but it was a voluntary and
extrajudicial act”—that is it was not within Marian authority.
Thus, because the victim’s examination was taken in
“circumstances where the Justice was not authorized to
administer an oath,” Eyre ruled that the examination “cannot

193

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47, 54 n.5.
Leach (1st ed. 1789) 437; 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352
(Old Bailey 1789). Unlike Radbourne, the version of the report of the 1789 ruling in
Woodcock that now appears in the English Reports is essentially unchanged from that
in Leach’s first and second editions, except for the addition of a final sentence
pertaining to the judge’s leaving to the jury the question of whether the deceased
victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration. See Woodcock, 1 Leach (4th ed.
1815) at 504, 168 Eng. Rep. at 354.
However, there is other evidence that Leach apparently misunderstood the
ruling in Woodcock when he published his first edition of Cases in Crown Law in 1789.
The initial report of Radbourne in that volume contained a marginal note to Woodcock
that erroneously indicated that the statement had been admitted in evidence even
though it was not a dying declaration. Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) 399, 400 n.(a)
(Old Bailey and Twelve Judges 1787). Actually, the jury’s conviction of the defendant
indicates that they must have decided the victim’s statement was a dying declaration,
and the text of the Leach’s original note was deleted in the 1792 second edition report
of Radbourne. I am indebted to Mr. Kry for a copy of the 1792 report.
195
The justice went to the local poorhouse to take the victim’s examination.
The case report does not state when the defendant (her husband) was arrested in
relation to the victim’s examination, or whether her allegations were known when the
defendant’s own examination was recorded.
194
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be admitted before a Jury as evidence; for no evidence can be
legal unless it be given upon oath, judicially taken.”196
The thrust of Eyre’s statement seems to be that an
examination of a deceased witness could be admissible under
Marian authority only if it were taken in connection with the
defendant’s arrest and committal.
Indeed, the logic he
expressed would seem to indicate that the victim’s examination
would have been inadmissible as being outside Marian
authority even if the prisoner had been present. (However, it is
difficult to square Eyre’s logic with the admission of the victim
examination in Radbourne—that is, assuming the latter had
involved Marian authority.197)
It may also be significant that Eyre referred only to the
prisoner’s loss of an opportunity to “contradict,” rather than to
a loss of an opportunity to cross-examine.198 Eyre’s use of
“contradict” suggests that his concern was that the defendant
lost the opportunity to have his response to the victim’s
allegation recorded for use at trial, rather than any opportunity
for the defendant to cross-examine or otherwise participate in
the victim’s examination.199
Marian procedure did not call only for the justice of the
peace to record the witness’s sworn information; in addition,
the justice of the peace was required to record the
“examination” of the prisoner as well. Unlike the witness
examinations, the written record of the prisoner’s examination
196
Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 440, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 502, 168 Eng. Rep.
330, 353 (Old Bailey 1787).
197
The victim’s examination that was admitted in Radbourne does not seem
to have been taken in connection with Radbourne’s arrest; hence, it does not seem to fit
Woodcock’s definition of the scope of Marian authority. That calls into question
whether Radbourne was actually understood to involve admission of a Marian
examination. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
Note, too, that there is also a tension between Woodcock and the “material
witness warrants” that were still appearing in the discussion of Marian procedure in
Burn’s justice of the peace manual, discussed supra notes 108-10 and accompanying
text. Those warrants seemed to imply a wider window for the exercise of Marian
examination authority. These tensions suggest to me that Marian procedure was
unsettled and undergoing change in England in 1789, not that it was settled as Kry
suggests.
198
I previously discussed the judge’s use of the term “contradict” rather than
“cross-examine.” See Davies, supra note 2, at 167 n.196.
199
Professor Langbein has described Woodcock as the first “judicial mention”
of the loss of cross-examination as a ground for excluding hearsay statements, but he
refers to a general statement of the reasons why hearsay statements were excluded
from evidence, not to Eyre’s specific reference to the defendant’s loss of an opportunity
to “contradict.” JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 238
(2003). I fear I previously misstated his view of Woodcock. See Davies, supra note 2, at
167 n.196.
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was always admissible evidence in his trial and was routinely
read to the jury.200 Hence, if the defendant failed to deny
factual accusations at the time of his arrest—that is, failed to
“contradict” them—the record of his examination could
undercut the credibility of any denial he made for the first time
later at trial, by which time he had had more time to arrange a
story.201 For example, according to the report of Radbourne in
the Proceedings of the Old Bailey, the prosecutor Garrow
argued that Radbourne’s guilt was shown by the fact that she
did not object when she heard the victim’s accusations, and
thus did not behave like an innocent person would have
behaved.202
Thus, when Eyre referred to the loss of the defendant’s
opportunity to “contradict” allegations, he may have meant
that the victim’s statement had been taken after the
defendant’s post-arrest examination had already been taken
and recorded, so the defendant had no opportunity to have his
contemporaneous denial of the victim’s allegations recorded for
possible use later in his defense at trial.203 If that is what Eyre
meant, his statement would not necessarily imply that the
prisoner should have been present for the victim’s examination.
Although the prisoner could have learned of the victim’s
allegations by hearing the witness examination in person, the
justice of the peace could also have informed the prisoner of the
allegations when he took the prisoner’s examination
separately—provided the victim’s examination had been taken
before the prisoner’s.204
200
See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429, 431 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S
HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 603-04, 606-07 (1787 ed.).
201
See supra note 190.
202
The importance attached to an arrestee’s immediate denial of a charge is
also evident in contemporary English procedure. See, e.g., Police and Criminal
Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.) (directing English police to caution suspects at the
start of an interrogation that “[i]t may harm your defense if you do not mention when
questioned something which you later rely on in court”).
203
The fact that the Dingler ruling was based on Woodcock suggests that the
scenario in Woodcock also involved a situation in which the victim’s examination was
conducted after the defendant had already been arrested and committed. See infra text
accompanying notes 212-13.
204
Kry suggests that the defendant in Woodcock

was not literally denied an opportunity to “contradict” the witness; he could
have given a contradictory account at trial after the deposition was read.
Implicit in the court’s holding is that the defendant was denied an
opportunity to contradict the witness at a time when the witness could be
required to respond to the contradictions—which is, in substance, an
opportunity to cross-examine.

612

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2

Thus, it is not clear that Eyre was actually referring to
any departure from an in-the-presence Marian practice when
he referred only to the loss of the defendant’s opportunity to
“contradict.”205 As with Radbourne, we can only guess at
critical aspects of Woodcock.
c. The 1791 Ruling in Dingler
The 1791 Old Bailey ruling in King v. Dingler,206 which
Crawford and Kry both invoke as evidence,207 now turns out to
be even more distant from the American framing than I
suggested in my 2005 article. Because I could not locate a copy
of Leach’s 1792 second edition, in that article I assumed that
Dingler would have been included in that edition, and simply
noted that it could not have been published prior to even the
ratification of the Sixth Amendment in 1791.208 However, Mr.
Kry located a copy of the second edition and discovered that
Dingler was not included in it.209 Instead, Dingler was never
reported until Leach’s third edition in 1800.210
The delay in the publication of Dingler is significant
because Dingler is the only one of the three cases cited by
Justice Scalia in Crawford that actually mentions “crossexamin[ation].” Even there, that term appeared only in an
argument by the defense counsel,211 not in a statement by the
court.
Kry, supra note 3, at 532.
The response to his first point is that a denial at trial would not be as
credible as a contemporaneous denial. See supra note 190. Kry’s claim as to what is
“implicit” in the court’s holding ignores the various ways that a defendant could
“contradict” allegations.
205
The interpretation I offer of Eyre’s comments would also explain why
Justice Ashhurst, who was also on the bench during Woodcock, did not object to a later
statement made by Justice Buller to the effect that there was no in-the-presence
requirement for Marian examinations. See infra text accompanying notes 229-30.
206
2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey 1791).
207
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46, 54 n.5; Kry, supra note 3, at 519-23.
208
Davies, supra note 2, at 157 n.164.
209
See Kry, supra note 3, at 519 n.107.
210
Dingler, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) 638 (Old Bailey 1791). However, Leach did
mention the still-unreported decision in Dingler in a passage he added in his 1795
edition of Hawkins’s treatise. See supra note 191.
211
See Dingler, 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 562, 168 Eng. Rep. at 383-84
(indicating that “cross-examination” was mentioned by “Garrow, for the prisoner”).
Kry suggests that the fact that the counsel was William Garrow was significant
because he was “the most famous criminal defense lawyer of his time” and if he
thought cross-examination was a right, that indicates that others also would have
thought that. Kry, supra note 3, at 533-34. However, Garrow could just as easily have
been on the cutting edge of the argument. Professor Langbein also describes Garrow
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Most of counsel’s arguments dealt with the issue of
whether the examination had been taken within the window of
Marian post-arrest authority. The only statement attributed to
the court was that the victim examination at issue was
inadmissible “on the authority of [Woodcock].”212 Because the
report in Dingler does clearly state that the defendant had
already been committed to jail to await trial when the victim’s
examination was taken, it seems fairly clear that the victim’s
statement was inadmissible because it was taken outside of the
window for the exercise of Marian authority created by a felony
arrest.213 Moreover, the court’s treatment of Woodcock as the
controlling authority in that setting would seem to imply that a
similar situation had occurred in Woodcock, as I speculated
above.
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler indicate that Marian
procedure in England was unsettled around the time of the
American framing. Woodcock and Dingler also appear to
indicate that English judges were beginning to take a more
restrictive view of the post-arrest window for exercising Marian
examination authority than had previously been the case. For
example, the rulings in Woodcock and Dingler do seem to rule
out taking examinations of material witnesses after the
committal of the prisoner, even though forms for such warrants
were still appearing in the justice of the peace manuals.214
However, Kry insists that these cases reflect a settled
in-the-presence rule for Marian examinations.215 He even
asserts that the 1789 ruling in Woodcock and the 1791 ruling
in Dingler “simply confirm what [Marian] procedure already
was.”216 However, that assertion seems to collide with Kry’s
as a “dominant figure” in that period, but characterizes him as “the trickster.”
LANGBEIN, supra note 199, at 332.
212
2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) at 641; 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 563, 168 Eng. Rep.
at 384.
213
The report in Dingler indicates that the victim’s examination was taken
the day after the defendant was arrested and “committed . . . to take his trial at the
next gaol delivery.” 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 561, 168 Eng. Rep. at 383.
214
See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
215
Kry, supra note 3, at 535 (citing Leach’s claims about Woodcock and
Dingler in the passage Leach added to the 1795 edition of Hawkins’s treatise, discussed
supra note 191, and noting that “[l]ater treatises and cases that conditioned
admissibility on an opportunity for cross-examination often similarly traced that
requirement to Woodcock and Dingler”).
216
Id. at 522. He also notes that those rulings “do not purport to change
Marian committal procedure in any way.” Id. However, the absence of a statement of
novelty would be significant only if one naively expects judges to announce what they
are doing whenever they innovate.
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own account of the evolution of Marian practice during the
eighteenth century.217 Indeed, if there was already a wellestablished in-the-presence legal rule for Marian witness
examinations in 1789 or 1791, why did the justices of the peace
who took the victims’ examinations in Woodcock and Dingler
think they were authorized to take witness examinations in the
absence of the arrestee? It is one thing to say that Woodcock
and Dingler indicate movement toward the creation of an inthe-presence rule; it is quite another to assume they merely
announced the continuation of an existing doctrine that
somehow had remained unstated.
d. The Statements of the King’s Bench Judges in
Eriswell
Kry’s suggestion that the 1789 Old Bailey ruling in
Woodcock reflected a settled in-the-presence rule is also
undermined by statements that the judges of King’s Bench
made in the 1790 ruling in King v. Inhabitants of Eriswell
(“Eriswell”).218 Eriswell was not a criminal case; it was a Crown
suit charging a town’s inhabitants with the care of a pauper
who had become insane.219 The issue was the admissibility of a
sworn examination of the pauper taken by justices of the peace
when the villagers of Eriswell were not represented.220 The
topic of Marian examination procedure came up only indirectly
as the judges discussed whether the pauper’s sworn statement
of residence constituted admissible evidence, but what the four
judges of King’s Bench said is significant because, by virtue of
that court’s jurisdiction, they had primacy in matters of
217

See supra notes 34-35, 164-65 and accompanying text.
3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1790). The report of this case in the
Term Reports, as reprinted in the English Reports, appears to be the same, with one
exception, to the report initially published in 1790 by Charles Durnford and Edward
Hyde East under the title, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of
King’s Bench from Hilary Term, 29th George III. to Trinity Term, 30th George III
(London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall). Durnford and East, the editors, added a footnote
in the 1797 edition to the effect that a Marian witness examination was not admissible
“unless the accused be present,” even though a coroner’s Marian examination was
admissible regardless. Eriswell, 3 T.R. (1797 ed.) at 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. at 817
n.(c). No such footnote appears in the 1790 edition. See 3 T.R. (1790 ed.) at 710.
However, Kry cites the “case report” in Eriswell as having “expressly
conditioned admissibility on either an opportunity to cross-examine or the prisoner’s
presence at the examination,” but he refers only to the 1797 footnote that was added by
the authors, not to any statement by the judges. See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12
(citing Eriswell, 3 T. R. (1797 ed.) at 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. at 817 n.(c)).
219
Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 707-08, 100 Eng. Rep. at 815-16.
220
Id. at 708, 100 Eng. Rep. at 816.
218
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criminal law and procedure.221 Indeed, Americans understood
that rulings by the King’s Bench were more authoritative than
those in the Old Bailey itself.222
Two of the justices, Buller and Ashhurst, ruled that the
deposition was admissible. In the course of the discussion,
Justice Buller made the following statement about Marian
examinations:
Where an act is judicially done, it is not necessary that the person to
be affected by it should be present in order to make it evidence
against him, and therefore depositions taken . . . in the absence of
the prisoner must be read. So it was determined by all the Judges in
Radburn’s case, Mich[aelmas Term] 1787.223

In Crawford, Justice Scalia dismissed Buller’s statement by
noting that an 1826 English commentary had criticized Buller
as misstating the fact that the deposition in Radbourne was
taken in the prisoner’s presence.224 Kry also asserts that
Radbourne “squarely refutes [Buller’s] position,” and cites
similar criticisms in 1801, 1802, and 1824 commentaries.225
However, Buller’s view of Radbourne cannot be so
readily dismissed because he had participated when the Twelve
Judges reviewed Radbourne’s conviction in December
Moreover, his statement in
[Michaelmas Term] 1787.226
Eriswell is not actually inconsistent with Leach’s initial report

221
There were four central or “superior” courts at Westminster in London:
King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Chancery. Although judges from these
central courts sometimes sat for trials in the Old Bailey, the felony trial court for
London, the King’s Bench had exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases in the
allocation of subject matter jurisdiction among the central courts. See 3 BLACKSTONE
(1st ed. 1768), supra note 78, at 42.
222
For example, in an 1807 Supreme Court argument, counsel cited
statements from the King’s Bench ruling in Eriswell but not from the Old Bailey
rulings in Woodcock or Dingler. See infra text accompanying note 300.
223
Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 713-14, 100 Eng. Rep. at 819. Buller was also identified
as the author of some editions of the treatise An Introduction to the Law Relative to
Trials at Nisi Prius, discussed supra note 118.
224
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-55 n.5.
225
Kry, supra note 3, at 526. Kry also says that nineteenth-century
commentators’ negative reception of Buller’s view suggests that “even around the time
Eriswell was decided, the prevailing view in the legal community was that Buller’s
dictum had misstated the law.” Id. at 527. However, the only evidence he offers for
that assessment are statements by commentators that appeared years later in 1797
and 1801. See id. at 526-27. Do commentators have more to do with “the prevailing
view” of criminal evidence doctrine than the judges of the King’s Bench?
226
Buller was appointed to the Court of King’s Bench in 1778. EDWARD FOSS,
JUDGES OF ENGLAND 252-53 (1864; reprinted 1966). The report of Radbourne shows all
of the Twelve Judges participated except Mansfield. King v. Radbourne, Leach (1st ed.
1789) 399, 401 (Old Bailey and Twelve Judges 1787).
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of Radbourne to the effect that the examination was simply
“read” in the defendant’s presence, rather than being “taken” in
her presence, which could be how Radbourne was argued to the
Twelve Judges. As noted above, the term “taken” did not
appear until the 1800 version of Radbourne.227 Thus, the
criticism of Buller seems to be based only on the revised 1800
version of Radbourne, which was not published until a decade
after Buller made his statement in Eriswell.
Justice Ashhurst said nothing in Eriswell about Marian
examinations, but simply expressed a reluctance to alter prior
law and concurred with Buller’s remarks in a general way.228
His silence is noteworthy because he had been on the Old
Bailey bench with Chief Baron Eyre during the trial in
Woodcock a year earlier.229 The fact that Ashhurst did not take
issue with Buller’s statement may indicate that Woodcock had
not ruled that the prisoner had to be present at the taking of a
Marian witness examination, but only had to have a chance to
“contradict” witnesses’ allegations in his own examination.230
The other two King’s Bench justices who participated in
Eriswell expressed the view that the pauper’s deposition should
be inadmissible. The significant point for present purposes is
that neither suggested that there was an in-the-presence rule
in Marian examinations themselves. Justice Grose stated that
Before the [Marian statute], a deposition taken before the justice of
the county where the murder was committed was not evidence, even
though the party died or was unable to travel. Why? Because
although the justice had jurisdiction to enquire into the fact, the
common law did not permit a person accused to be affected by an
examination taken in his absence, because he could not cross
examine; and therefore that statute was made.231

Note that Grose indicated that the Marian statute had been
enacted to permit the admission of ex parte examinations.

227

See supra note 191.
Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 720-21, 100 Eng. Rep. at 822-23.
229
Unlike modern American trials, it was common for more than one judge to
be on the bench during a criminal trial in the Old Bailey. See King v. Woodcock, 1
Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (Old Bailey 1789) (stating that
“Woodcock was tried before Lord Chief Baron Eyre, present Mr. Justice Ashhurst, and
Mr. Sergeant Adair, Recorder”).
230
See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
231
Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 710, 100 Eng. Rep. at 817 (emphasis added) (notes
omitted). This was the point to which the authors of Term Reports addressed the
footnote described supra note 218.
228
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Additionally, Chief Justice Kenyon appears to have
conceded that Marian witness examinations in felony cases
constituted “exceptions” to the usual rules for admitting
depositions.232 Kry concedes that “Grose and Kenyon never
clearly dispute[d Buller’s] premise,”233 but that is an
understatement.
Kry admits that the statements of the King’s Bench
judges in the 1790 ruling in Eriswell demonstrate that “[t]he
[in-the-presence] rule articulated by Radbourne, Woodcock, and
Dingler was not universally accepted.”234 However, how was it
a “rule” if the judges of King’s Bench did not recognize it? The
judges’ statements in Eriswell cut against the existence of any
in-the-presence rule in Marian procedure as of 1790. In fact,
Kry mentions that the judges made comments similar to those
in Eriswell in another case in 1793.235
Remarkably, Kry nevertheless announces under the
heading “Conclusion” that, “[a]t some point before the
framing”—that is, 1789—the practice of “routinely conduct[ing
Marian witness examinations] in the prisoner’s presence” had
“hardened into a procedural right.”236 How can that be when
the judges of King’s Bench apparently knew of no such rule in
1790 or 1793? As noted above, no such rule was stated in any
of the treatises or justice of the peace manuals that had been
published by 1789; the first claim of any such rule appears in
Leach’s alterations of Hawkins’s treatise in 1795—six years
after the framing—and it was based only on Leach’s own report
of the 1789 ruling in Woodcock and the still unpublished 1791
232

Id. at 722, 100 Eng. Rep. at 823. Kenyon said:

It has been said that there are cases where examinations [not taken in the
presence of the party] are admitted, namely, before the coroner, and before
magistrates in cases of felony. . . . Those exceptions alluded to are founded on
the [Marian statutes]; and that they go no further is abundantly proved. . . .
But, without stating the cases which occur on this head, I will do little more
than to refer to the case of The King v. Paine in Salk. 281, & 5 Mod. 163.
That was not loosely decided, but was the opinion of this Court assisted by
the Court of Common Pleas. In Salkeld[’s report of that case] it is expressly
said that the rule cannot be extended further than the particular case of
felony . . . .
Id. at 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. at 823-24.
233
Kry, supra note 3, at 525.
234
Id. at 524.
235
Id. at 526 n.137 (citing King v. Ravenstone, 5 T.R. 373, 374, 101 Eng. Rep.
209, 209 (K.B. 1793)).
236
Id. at 527 (emphasis added). Even more remarkably, Kry writes in the
conclusion of his article that it is hard to say “[h]ow long before the framing” the
“procedural right” to be present “hardened.” Id. at 554.
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ruling in Dingler.237 Prior to 1795, the supposed rule is missing
from the very authorities that were meant to instruct justices
of the peace in taking Marian examinations.
The bottom line is that Kry’s conclusion regarding a
“hardened” in-the-presence rule outstrips his evidence.238
Likewise, his pre-framing evidence falls far short of Crawford’s
claim of a settled cross-examination rule. As noted above, all
Kry claims about a right to cross-examine in Marian
examinations is that, at the time of the 1789 framing, the
“absence of such a right” was not “firmly established.”239
Kry’s English evidence indicates that the English (or
London) bar was agitating for in-the-presence and crossexamination rules in 1789, but that the English bench was still
resisting that demand. Indeed, one 1789 evidence commentary
says precisely that.240 However, it is not clear whether this
agitation had spread beyond London committal proceedings,
and there is no evidence that Americans were aware of it.

237

See supra note 191.
Kry cites two English cases in addition to the cases discussed in the text.
He asserts that the King’s Bench held in 1761 “that testimony must be given in the
prisoner’s presence.” Kry, supra note 3, at 545 (citing King v. Vipont, 2 Burr. 1163,
1165, 97 Eng. Rep. 767, 768 (K.B. 1761)). However, that case did not involve Marian
practice because it did not involve a felony, and it appears that the justice of the peace
who decided the case in a summary proceeding treated a single deposition as conclusive
proof of the defendant’s guilt, and in effect denied him a trial.
Kry also discusses Ayrton v. Addington, an unreported 1780 civil lawsuit,
as an example of “attempted cross-examination at a committal hearing.” Id. at 538.
However, in that instance, the magistrate William Addington had refused to permit an
attorney, Thomas Ayrton, to cross-examine a witness at a committal hearing because it
was “‘not a trial but an examination of prisoners,’” and, when the attorney persisted,
the magistrate had him removed from the hearing room. Id. at 537 (quoting Ayrton v.
Addington (Dec. 7, 1780), in 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1023, 1025-26 (1992)). The
attorney then sued the magistrate and the jury gave a verdict for the attorney. Id. at
538. Kry suggests that the jury’s approval of cross-examination is “[i]mplicit in the
verdict,” but that is far from clear; it seems likely that the attorney’s removal was the
gravamen of the lawsuit. Id.
Similarly, Kry cites London newspaper accounts of incidents in 1774 in
which cross-examination was disallowed during a committal hearing, and in 1786 in
which cross-examination was allowed. Id. at 538-39.
239
Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
240
See 1 JOHN MORGAN, ESSAYS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, NEW TRIALS,
SPECIAL VERDICTS, TRIALS AT BAR, AND REPLEADERS 431 (London 1789) (stating that
the admissibility of Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses “shews the
propriety and justice of permitting a prisoner by himself, or counsel to cross-examine
any witnesses produced against him, before the magistrate, though some justices have
strenuously contended against the right”).
238
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4. London Marian Practices Do Not Illuminate
American Marian Practices
A second objection to Kry’s descriptions of English
Marian practice is that there is no reason to assume that
English practice, as opposed to published English doctrine,
informed American Marian practice. Indeed, Kry primarily
describes practice in London.241 It makes sense that the high
volume of arrests in London and its environs would have led to
an unusual degree of institutionalization of felony committal
hearings. As a result, “Newgate solicitors” may have found it
worthwhile to hang around the London committal courtroom
because of the high volume of potential business to be found
there, and London magistrates may have accommodated
them.242 However, it seems unlikely that similar circumstances
would have existed in rural England or even in smaller cities,
where Marian committal hearings would not have been held on
such a routinized basis.243 Hence, it is not clear that the urban
Marian practice that Kry describes would even have been
typical of the rest of England in 1789, much less America.
Additionally, Kry argues that cross-examination became
relevant to English Marian practice only when London justices
of the peace began to depart from the doctrinal rule by widely
exercising extra-legal discretion to dismiss felony charges at
Marian committal hearings if they concluded that evidence of
the arrestee’s guilt was weak.244 However, there is no evidence
that American justices of the peace widely exercised similar
discretion.245 Rather, the framing-era American justice of the

241

There are references to London throughout Kry’s descriptions of preframing, eighteenth-century English practice: e.g., Middlesex, Newgate (the prison
adjacent to the Old Bailey), Bow Street, the Guildhall magistrates’ court, etc.
242
Kry notes that “Newgate solicitors” appeared in committal hearings in
London, and suggests that shows there is “no substance” to my prior statement that
arrestees would not have been represented by counsel at the time of a Marian
committal proceeding. See Kry, supra note 3, at 530 n.154 (criticizing Davies, supra
note 2, at 170). However, there is no apparent reason to assume that lawyers would
have been as active in committal hearings outside of London or other large cities, and
there is no apparent basis for assuming that lawyers would have been widely involved
in American Marian committal practice.
243
For example, the Old Bailey had eight trial sessions a year, but outlying
cities had only two assizes a year. See LANGBEIN, supra note 199, at 17.
244
Kry, supra note 3, at 528-29, 554-55 (noting that cross-examination in
Marian examinations served no purpose without this development).
245
Kry does not offer any evidence as to how American justices of the peace
conducted Marian examinations prior to 1789, other than noting a 1766 controversy in
New York in which a magistrate did not permit cross-examination. Id. at 539.
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peace manuals followed Burn’s manual by stating the doctrinal
rule that a justice of the peace had authority only to commit or
bail, but not release, an arrestee at a Marian hearing.246 Hence,
there is no evidence that there was any reason for crossexamination to emerge in American Marian practice. London
practice simply does not amount to evidence of American
practice.
5. How Would Americans Learn of London Marian
Practice?
A third objection to Kry’s account of English (London)
practice is that framing-era Americans generally had no way to
learn of English practices unless they were described in
published sources.247 But no such published descriptions have
been identified. Kry ignores this point when, in addition to
describing London practice, he cites an unreported English
case and London newspaper accounts of other cases.248 How
could framing-era Americans possibly have learned of those?
The crucial fact is that Kry does not identify any description of
in-the-presence Marian practice in any pre-framing publication
that would have been likely to come to the attention of
Americans.
Rather, as discussed above, the published
descriptions of Marian procedure in framing-era authorities
were either silent on such aspects or implied that they were not
part of Marian procedure. How were framing-era Americans
246

Burn recited,

If a felony is committed, and one is brought before a justice upon suspicion
thereof, and the justice finds upon examination that the prisoner is not
guilty; yet the justice shall not discharge him, but he must either be bailed or
committed: for it is not fit that a man once arrested and charged with felony,
or suspicion thereof, should be delivered upon any man’s discretion, without
farther trial. Dalt. c. 164.
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 295 (1755 ed.); 1 id. at 536 (1785 ed.). American manuals
repeated this statement. See GREENLEAF, supra note 110, at 131; GRIMKE, supra note
110, at 199; HODGE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 178; GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, supra
note 110, at 145; LADD, supra note 110, at 156. Starke’s description of Virginia
practice in the early 1770s suggests that justices of the peace did not exercise
discretion to dismiss in the Marian hearing itself when witness examinations were
taken; rather, Virginia created a unique “Court of Examination” that met five to ten
days after the arrest and that court was given a “Power of Acquittal” if it deemed the
evidence too weak to justify the prosecution. See STARKE, supra note 110, at 114-15.
247
This concern is not hypothetical. For example, the 1761 Writs of Assistance
Case in Boston was adjourned for several months because no one could locate any
published information as to how a writ of assistance was used for customs searches in
England. See generally M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978).
248
See supra note 238.
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supposed to have learned of the London Marian practice that
Kry now describes?
The only answer Kry offers is that nine of the American
Framers, primarily from the southern states, had studied at
the Inns of Court in London along with a hundred or so other
Americans.249 However, that is a bit too facile. One problem is
timing: the data Kry cites refers to American lawyers who
studied in London “between 1760 and 1775.”250 It makes sense
that they studied prior to the outbreak of the Revolutionary
War in 1775 and American independence in 1776, but 1760 to
1775 would be considerably too early even for the “emerging
consensus” that by Kry’s account was only “hardening” into an
in-the-presence rule “by the time of the framing” in 1789.251
Moreover, it is hardly obvious that Americans who
crossed the Atlantic for an expensive course of legal study
would have devoted much of their attention to Marian
committal proceedings, the lowest rung of English felony
justice. In the stratified English legal community, the Inns of
Court trained barristers, not lowly “Newgate solicitors.”252 It
seems likely that the Americans who traveled to London for
legal studies and “‘personal contact with some of England’s
leading lawyers and judges’”253 would have directed their
attention primarily to higher-status subjects like property,
equity, legal actions, and civil procedure. Indeed, Blackstone’s
Commentaries provide some indirect evidence—they were
written for the student of English law but barely mentioned
Marian procedure.254
249

Kry, supra note 3, at 522.
Id.
251
See supra text accompanying note 236.
252
Newgate was the infamous prison in London adjacent to the Old Bailey;
“Newgate solicitors” would have been fairly low in the hierarchy of the English legal
community.
253
Kry, supra note 3, at 522 (quoting 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 33 (1965)).
254
Blackstone’s Commentaries were meant to provide such a study. He
mentioned Marian witness examinations only once in the four volumes of the
commentaries, at the beginning of chapter 22 on “Commitment and Bail” in criminal
proceedings, but did not mention any requisites of such examinations—not even that
they had to be under oath:
250

The justice, before whom such [arrested] prisoner is brought, is bound
immediately to examine the circumstances of the crime alleged: and to this
end by statute of 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 10. he is to take in writing the
examination of such prisoner, and the information of those who bring him:
which Mr. Lambard observes, was the first warrant given for the
examination of a felon in English law. For, at the common law, nemo
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The mere fact that some Americans attended the Inns of
Court prior to 1775 is too frail a hook on which to hang
American knowledge of unpublished English committal
practices as of 1789. That hook is especially frail because, as I
note below, post-framing American sources from 1794, and
even 1807, do not reflect any awareness of Radbourne,
Woodcock, or Dingler.255 The bottom line is that, even if Kry’s
description of English practice were accurate, he has not shown
the relevance of that description to the Framers’ design—and
that is crucial for a claim of original meaning.
6. Coroners’ Marian Examinations
In addition, there is one aspect of English Marian
practice that plainly did not involve an in-the-presence or
cross-examination rule in 1789—coroners’ Marian witness
examinations. The Marian statutes also provided for coroners
to take sworn witness examinations in the course of
Coroners conducted
investigating a suspicious death.256
inquests on view of the body to determine whether a crime had
been committed and, if so, who was the likely killer. Because
no defendant was identified until the conclusion of the
proceeding, it is patent that there could not have been either
an in-the-presence or cross-examination rule for coroners’
witness examinations. Yet, framing-era treatises and manuals
affirmed the admissibility of coroners’ examinations of
unavailable witnesses in felony trials.257
tenebatur prodere seipsum; and his fault was not to be wrung out of himself,
but rather discovered by other means, and other men. If upon this inquiry it
manifestly appears, either that no such crime was committed, or that the
suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless, in such cases
only is it lawful totally to discharge him. Otherwise, he must either be
committed to prison, or give bail . . . .
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 293 (1st ed. 1769) (footnote omitted). Note that the
focus of this passage is on the examination of the arrestee, but little is said of witness
examinations themselves; note also that Blackstone stated such a low threshold for
proceeding to commit or bail the arrestee that cross-examination would rarely have
made any difference.
The 1791 lectures in law given by James Wilson (one of the Framers of the
Constitution and one of the earliest justices of the Supreme Court) in Philadelphia do
not seem to mention Marian witness examinations at all. See THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
255
See infra text following note 287 (no mention of the cases in 1794 North
Carolina case), 293 (no mention of the cases in 1794 Virginia justice of the peace
manual), 297 (no mention of the cases in 1807 Supreme Court argument).
256
See Davies, supra note 2, at 128.
257
Id. at 171-72.
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In Crawford, Justice Scalia breezed past this
inconvenient fact in one evasive footnote.258 Kry at least
addresses the difficulty. Although he concedes that coroners’
Marian examinations were admissible, and also concedes that
the defendant need not even have been identified or present
when such examinations occurred, he takes refuge in a
palpable fiction—because coroners’ inquests were open to the
public, a potential defendant could have chosen to attend and
could even have chosen to cross-examine the witnesses. Thus,
the requirement of an “opportunity” for such was met and
“those who failed to show up to cross-examine had simply
neglected their rights.”259 In addition to offering this notion of
constructive presence, Kry notes that American state cases in
1835, 1842, and 1844 began refusing to admit coroners’
examinations in criminal trials.260
However, the significant fact for assessing the original
understanding of the Confrontation Clause is that the framingera treatises and justice of the peace manuals never suggested
that either an in-the-presence rule or cross-examination rule
applied to Marian coroners’ examinations of witnesses, and
they did not condition the admissibility of coroners’
examinations of unavailable witnesses on the examination
having been taken in the prisoner’s presence or having been
subject to cross-examination rules. Indeed, Kry cites English
statements that indicate that no such conditions were placed
on the admissibility of coroners’ Marian examinations well
after the 1789 framing.261
7. Summary of Kry’s Pre-Framing Evidence
In sum, I do not think Mr. Kry has presented historical
evidence that sheds much light on the original American
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. Rather, like
258

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2 (suggesting “[t]here [was] some question
whether the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination applied as well to
statements taken by a coroner, which were also authorized by the Marian statutes” but
citing only post-framing sources as grounds for that “question”).
259
Kry, supra note 3, at 547.
260
Id. at 547 & n.253 (citing cases from 1835, 1842, 1844, and 1858).
261
For example, Kry several times cites a 1797 footnote added to the Eriswell
case report by the reporters of that volume to the effect that “Nor [are committal
depositions admissible] since [the Marian statutes], unless the party accused be
present, though an examination before a coroner is.” Id. at 496 n.12, 523 n.126, 527
n.143, 547 n.256 (citing King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817
n.(c) (K.B. 1790)). See supra note 218.
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Crawford, he has focused on matters that are, at best,
marginally relevant and often ambiguous, while he has
downplayed or dismissed the treatises and manuals that
provide the best evidence we have of the Framers’
understanding of Marian procedure. Although Kry offers a
description of the evolution of English Marian practice itself, he
has paid little heed to the essential question of what Americans
would have known about that practice, and when they would
have known it. Indeed, he has not even shown that there was a
settled English in-the-presence rule that Americans could have
discovered in 1789, let alone the settled cross-examination rule
asserted in Crawford.
V.

KRY’S POST-FRAMING EVIDENCE

Kry suggests that because the pre-framing evidence is
“conflicting,” it is appropriate “to consider a broader range of
historical evidence,” including post-framing evidence.262 He
asserts that post-framing evidence is relevant and effectively
assumes that later statements reveal earlier doctrine. Indeed,
he asserts that “[w]hile the pre-framing evidence is ambiguous,
the post-framing evidence is devastating.”263
It certainly is true that post-framing sources are crucial
to Kry’s arguments.
I invite the reader to perform an
experiment: make a copy of Kry’s article, black out all
statements that are based on post-1789 sources as well as on
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler, the three cases that were
published too late to have informed the American framing, and
see what is left. Kry characterizes our disagreement over
relevant evidence as “a question of timing.”264 I think “time
travel” would be more apt.
I do not deny that there might be instances in which
post-framing statements could carry sufficient indicia of
continuity with earlier doctrine to make it appropriate to treat
them as evidence of original meaning. However, none of the
post-framing sources that Kry offers fall into that category.265

262

Kry, supra note 3, at 542.
Id. at 551.
264
Id. at 495.
265
An American case or statement from the immediate aftermath of the
framing might constitute valid evidence of the original understanding if the case or
statement exhibits some indicia of continuity. For example, if an American state case
from the decade after the framing had said something like “As we have construed our
263
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Rather, I think his post-framing evidence is essentially
irrelevant for reconstructing the original American
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. Let me briefly
review the post-framing sources he relies upon, and then
address the real issue—Kry’s assumption of judicial
consistency over time.
A.

Kry’s Post-Framing English Evidence

Kry argues that in English law, “admissibility [of
Marian examinations] clearly became conditioned, at some
point, on whether the defendant had an opportunity to crossexamine,” and cites as evidence seven post-framing English
treatises, three post-framing English cases, and a post-framing
footnote added to a case report by the reporters rather than the
court.266 However, “at some point” does not amount to a claim
about “the Framers’ design.”267 The critical fact is that these
post-framing English sources that endorsed an in-the-presence
or cross-examination rule cited no precedents or authorities
between the 1696 rulings in Paine and Fenwick and the 1787,
1789, and 1791 decisions in Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler
(the three cases that were published too late to have informed
the framing of the Confrontation Clause). Moreover, it is
noteworthy that a number of the commentaries that Kry cites
were written by members of the London bar who probably were
partisans in the campaign for recognition of in-the-presence
and cross-examination rules in Marian procedure.268 Kry does
not identify any English court ruling that endorsed those rules
until 1814—twenty-five years after the 1789 framing of the
Confrontation Clause.269 Thus, the post-framing statements
Kry cites do not provide evidence that an in-the-presence or
cross-examination rule was recognized in England prior to the
American framing.270
statute for many years . . . ,” one would have to give some weight to that as relevant
evidence of the framing-era understanding. However, Kry cites no such case.
266
Kry, supra note 3, at 495 & nn.11-12.
267
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
268
For example, Leonard MacNally authored one of the English treatises that
Kry cites. See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.11 (citing LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES
OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Dublin 1802)). MacNally also appears as
defense counsel in Kry’s account. See id. at 539 (referring to a cross-examination by
“Mr. MacNally”). See also supra note 204.
269
See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12.
270
I invite the reader to peruse the authorities set out in Kry, supra note 3, at
495 nn.11-12.
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My 2005 article did not dispute or downplay the fact
that a cross-examination rule was adopted in England in the
decades after the American framing.271 In fact, my 2005 article
actually introduced some of the post-framing treatises and
cases Kry now cites.272 I simply noted the basic point that what
was said in England after the framing does not constitute
evidence of what the American Framers thought at the time of
the framing.
B.

Kry’s Post-Framing American Evidence

Kry also cites several post-framing American
statements in cases and commentaries. However, none of these
statements constitute significant evidence that Americans
understood in 1789 that a cross-examination rule was part of
Marian procedure.
1. “Early” State Cases
Like Justice Scalia in Crawford, Kry also stresses postframing American state cases. Although Justice Scalia invoked
the authority of “numerous early state cases,” two were plainly
inapposite,273 and of the nine remaining, only one was decided
prior to 1821.274 Kry omits the inapposite cases (unlike Justice
Scalia who continues to include them275), but Kry has added
further cases, reaching sixteen decided “between 1794 and
271

Davies, supra note 2, at 173-78.
For example, I initially identified the passage that Thomas Leach added to
the 1795 edition of Hawkins’s treatise. See id. at 173. That is the earliest English
commentary that endorsed a cross-examination rule. See Kry, supra note 3, at 495
n.11. Likewise, I initially identified King v. Smith, Holt 614, 171 Eng. Rep. 357 (1817).
See Davies, supra note 2, at 174 n.224; Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12. Justice Scalia
did not cite either of these authorities in Crawford.
273
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (citing, inter alia, Finn v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. 701, 708 (1827); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229 (Super. Ct. 1807) (per curiam)). These
two cases are inapposite because they excluded oral testimony regarding testimony a
deceased witness had given at a prior trial, rather than a written record of a Marian
examination. As I previously explained, there was no transcript of the prior court
testimony, so an oral account of it was deemed less reliable than a written record of a
witness examination; hence, there was a settled rule against admitting oral accounts of
prior testimony that had nothing to do with cross-examination. See Davies, supra note
2, at 180 n.235. Kry contends that these cases were offered for only a narrow point in
Crawford. See Kry, supra note 3, at 546 n.246. However, they appear in Crawford as
“cases to the same effect” as those that deal with cross-examination. See Crawford, 541
U.S. at 50.
274
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (citing two cases from the 1820s, two from
the 1830s, two from the 1840s, and three from the 1850s).
275
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2275 n.3 (2006).
272
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1858,” plus a “cf.” cite.276 However, Kry still identifies only
three cases prior to the 1830s, and they constitute only limited
evidence: the earliest is a 1794 case that did not actually
involve the pertinent issue, and the other two are merely
offspring of the 1794 case.
The earliest American case Kry cites is the 1794 North
Carolina case, State v. Webb.277 I am chagrined that when I
wrote my prior article, I did not notice that Webb did not
actually deal with the pertinent issue.278 Although the cryptic
one-paragraph statement by the court did refer to an in-thepresence standard and right to cross-examine for admitting a
witness “deposition” as a matter of “natural justice,”279 Mr. Kry
errs when he describes the case as involving a Marian
examination of an “unavailable” witness.280 As noted above, the
settled understanding, which was stated explicitly in the
English treatises that the prosecutor offered as authority for
admitting the witness deposition, was that a Marian deposition
was admissible only if the witness was genuinely unavailable—
that is, he could not attend the trial because he was dead, too
ill to travel, or was kept away by the defendant.281 However, it
appears that the witness in Webb did not meet any of those
criteria—he was merely in South Carolina.282
276

Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.13. Kry also includes a “cf.” cite to an 1808
Kentucky bastardy case overruling a decision by a lower court to admit the complaint
for an arrest “warrant” as evidence. Id.
277
2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 139 (Super. Ct. 1794), discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S. at
49; cited in Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.13. See also Kry, supra note 3, at 548 (citing
American cases “between 1794 and 1858”).
278
See Davies, supra note 2, at 181 (incorrectly stating that Webb offered
support for Justice Scalia’s position).
279
Webb, 2 N.C. at 139 (“[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural
justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to
cross-examine . . . .”).
280
Kry, supra note 3, at 502 (emphasis added) (stating that the prosecutor in
Webb sought “to admit an unavailable witness’s deposition taken ex parte”). Justice
Scalia said nothing about the availability of the witness in Crawford. See 541 U.S. at
49.
281
The prosecutor cited passages in the treatises by Hale, Hawkins, and
Buller. Webb, 2 N.C. at 139. Hale referred to witnesses who had died or were too ill to
travel. See 2 HALE, supra note 89, at 52. Hawkins referred to witnesses who were
dead, too ill to travel, or kept away by the defendant. See supra note 84. Buller
referred to witnesses who were “dead.” See supra text accompanying note 117. Cf.
Kry, supra note 3, at 553 (“Throughout the eighteenth century, it was settled law that
a Marian deposition was admissible at trial if the witness was dead, too sick to travel,
or kept away by the accused.”).
282
See Webb, 2 N.C. at 139 (reporting the only description of the witness and
deposition offered by the prosecutor: “the deposition of one Young, to whom [Webb] had
sold the horse in South Carolina”).
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Given that the witness who had been deposed did not
meet any of the unavailability criteria, it is hardly surprising
that the North Carolina judges found that the admissibility
rule set out in the English treatises cited by the prosecutor was
inapplicable.283 Instead, it appears that the North Carolina
judges construed the state Marian statute as though it
incorporated the common-law cross-examination standard that
pertained to admitting depositions in civil cases. Indeed, the
“natural justice” language that they used appears in a number
of passages in pre-framing English authorities that pertain to
the admissibility of “depositions” in civil lawsuits.284 It may
also be significant that the North Carolina judges referred to
the witness statement at issue as a “deposition,” rather than as
an “examination,” the term that actually appears in the North
Carolina Marian statute.285 Hence, the statements in Webb
were not actually made in the context of resolving the
admissibility of a Marian examination of a genuinely
unavailable witness; rather, the context resembles that of a
civil lawsuit deposition taken when it would merely be
inconvenient for a witness to attend a trial.286
Nevertheless, Webb was later invoked as the relevant
authority in the 1798 and 1821 cases that Kry cites, both of
which involved the admissibility of a victim’s Marian
examination that had been taken in the presence of the
arrestee. The 1798 North Carolina case that Kry identifies,
State v. Moody,287 was decided by the same court (and largely
the same judges) that had decided Webb only four years earlier.
Although the court ruled that the victim’s statement could not
be admitted because it had not been properly sworn, one judge

283
See Kry, supra note 3, at 502-03 (noting that the prosecutor cited passages
on the admissibility of Marian depositions of unavailable witnesses from “Hale,
Hawkins, and Buller on which Davies relies”). Kry suggests that my interpretation of
the issue is “implausible” because it would mean that the prosecutor made a
“nonsensical” argument to the North Carolina court. Id. at 503 n.42. I suggest that
inapt citations are not an uncommon feature of arguments made in the course of
litigation.
284
See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 15, at 62 (1756 ed.) (“’tis against natural
Justice” to admit a “Deposition” if the party “had not Liberty to cross-examine the
Witnesses”).
285
See supra note 81. The language of the North Carolina Marian Statute is
set out in Davies, supra note 2, at 181 n.239.
286
See supra notes 81-82.
287
3 N.C. (2. Hayw.) 50 (1798).
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did make a statement that appears to have reiterated the inthe-presence standard previously announced in Webb.288
It should also be noted that the North Carolina cases
appear to have announced a homegrown doctrine. Although
Kry writes that Webb “essentially replicated the reasoning of
Woodcock and Dingler,”289 the important fact is that Webb did
not refer to the English reports of Radbourne or Woodcock (and
Dingler had not yet been published). Thus, Webb suggests that
Americans either did not immediately become familiar with
Leach’s reports of Old Bailey cases when they were published
sometime in late 1789, or did not regard them as authoritative.
The next case chronologically that Crawford cited, and
that Kry cites, is the 1821 Tennessee ruling in Johnston v.
State, which admitted a witness examination taken in the
defendant’s presence.290 However, Johnston is also an offspring
of Webb. The Tennessee judges regarded the 1715 North
Carolina Marian statute as having been absorbed into
Tennessee law (presumably because Tennessee was created
from North Carolina territory), and thus treated Webb as a
pertinent construction of that statute. As a result, the three
pre-1830 cases Kry cites all really boil down to one decision, the
1794 decision in Webb.
Kry then also cites two state cases from the 1830s, five
from the 1840s, and five from the 1850s. However, those cases
are hardly proximate to the framing in 1789. Even by the

288
Moody involved the admissibility of a statement a murder victim had made
on the day after the attack; however, because he died six or seven weeks later, the
court concluded that the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration. Id. at
50-51. Judge John Haywood then raised the possibility that the statement would be
admissible as a Marian examination of an unavailable witness:

[I]t may be a question whether [the victim’s statement] may not be received
as an examination taken on oath before a justice of the peace, pursuant to the
act of Assembly prescribed for such depositions in cases of felony [that is, the
North Carolina Marian statute]; when regularly taken pursuant to the act,
and the witness afterwards dies, it may be read in evidence; more especially
if the party to be affected by that testimony were present at the examination,
as the prisoner was in the present case.
Id. The deposition was not admitted, however, because there was a question as to
whether it was properly sworn. See id. at 51. It is unclear if Haywood was on the
bench of North Carolina Superior Court (that is, the state supreme court) when Webb
was decided in the “September Term, 1794” because he was elected to the court in
1794. I agree with Kry that Judge Haywood’s “more especially” phrasing probably
meant “more specifically” in 1798. See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.13.
289
See Kry, supra note 3, at 534.
290
10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 51, 52-53 (1821), cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. See
also Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12.
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1820s, American courts could have begun inventing new
understandings of the confrontation right, or—because the
nineteenth-century English treatises that Kry cites were
circulating in America by the 1820s—the nineteenth-century
American cases he cites may have simply imported the new
English understanding of Marian procedure.291
2. Other Post-Framing American Sources
Kry discusses three additional American statements.
One involved a 1766 complaint about the denial of crossexamination in a committal proceeding in colonial New York.292
Although it is true that there was a complaint, the fact that the
court refused to allow cross-examination would appear to
indicate the absence of a legally recognized right.293 The other
two statements are from 1794 and 1807.
In 1794, William Waller Hening criticized the
admissibility of Marian witness examinations of unavailable
witnesses when he wrote his justice of the peace manual, The
New Virginia Justice. Specifically, Hening objected that “[t]he
doctrine laid down in the books” regarding the admissibility of
Marian examinations of deceased or otherwise unavailable
witnesses was liable to the objection that “the accused party
has not the same advantage of cross examination, which he
would possess before a court, with the assistance of counsel.”294
Kry stresses Hening’s use of the word “same” and reads this to
mean that the accused was entitled to cross-examine the
witness on his own during a Marian examination.295 Even by
that literal reading, however, Hening would have referred only
291
See Davies, supra note 2, at 180 n.234. See also Kry, supra note 3, at 495
n.11 (citing several American printings of English commentaries). The 1821 Tennessee
decision in Johnston cited the evidence treatise by Phillipps that Kry cites. See
Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58 (1821); Kry, supra note 3, at 495 n.11 (citing
S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1814)). For example, in 1824,
Nathaniel Dane cited “M’Nally” (that is, MacNally’s evidence treatise; see Kry, supra
note 3, at 495 n.11), Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler when discussing the
admissibility of Marian witness examinations. See 3 NATHANIEL DANE, A GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 372-73 (1824). Interestingly, Dane
attributed an in-the-presence rule to Radbourne, but did not actually mention an
opportunity for cross-examination.
292
Kry, supra note 3, at 539.
293
See Davies, supra note 2, at 188 n.269.
294
WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 147 (entered for
publication 1794, printed in Richmond 1795). The passage is quoted in Davies, supra
note 2, at 187.
295
Kry, supra note 3, at 535.
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to a minimal opportunity for cross-examination. Moreover, I do
not think it is clear that Kry’s reading is correct. Hening’s
statement could also be read idiomatically as a complaint that
the accused lacked both the opportunity to cross-examine and
the assistance of counsel that he would have enjoyed during a
trial.
It is also worth noting that Hening made no mention in
1794 of Radbourne or Woodcock, five years after the reports of
those cases were initially published in Leach’s reports of Old
Bailey cases (Dingler still had not been published). In fact,
although Hening did cite some English case reports published
in London contemporaneously with the framing, he did not cite
Leach’s reports at all.296 Thus, Hening’s reference to the rule of
admissibility “laid down in the books” seems to confirm that he
was not aware of any alteration of earlier doctrine regarding
the admissibility of Marian examinations of unavailable
witnesses.
The other post-framing American statement that Kry
invokes is a question posed by Chief Justice John Marshall
during the 1807 arguments in Ex Parte Bollman, a proceeding
related to the Burr conspiracy.297 Bollman had been arrested
as a conspirator and sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
Supreme Court. An issue arose as to whether an affidavit by
General Wilkerson, made after Bollman’s arrest for treason,
could be admitted as evidence to determine whether there was
probable cause to support the arrest warrant issued for
Bollman.298 The Court requested that the attorneys present
authorities on the issue.299
At the next Court session, Bollman’s attorney, Francis
Scott Key, cited statements from the King’s Bench ruling in
Eriswell as authority that an “extrajudicial” affidavit is

296
At least one of the 1795 printings of Hening’s manual includes a list of the
legal authorities cited in the manual among the opening, unnumbered pages. Hening
did not include Leach’s Cases in Crown Law but he did include the “Term Reports” of
King’s Bench rulings. There are several citations to the third volume of those reports
that was published in 1790 (the volume in which Eriswell was reported; see supra note
232). See, e.g., HENING, supra note 294, at 176, 178 (citing “3 Term Rep. 590,” “3 Term
Rep. 27”). The fact that Hening cited recent reports of King’s Bench cases but not Old
Bailey cases suggests that Americans in 1794 still accorded significance to decisions in
the King’s Bench itself but may have been less interested in trial rulings in the Old
Bailey.
297
Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
298
Id. at 110-11, 123-24.
299
Id. at 123.
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inadmissible.300 (Notably, he did not cite the Old Bailey rulings
in Woodcock or Dingler—again suggesting that Americans were
not consulting Leach’s reports.) As Kry notes, Chief Justice
Marshall then asked:
If a person makes an affidavit before a magistrate to obtain a
warrant of arrest, such affidavit must necessarily be ex parte. But
how is it on a motion to commit, after the person is taken? Must not
the commitment be upon testimony given in the presence of the
prisoner?301

However, Attorney General Caesar Rodney responded
that the ex parte affidavit for the arrest warrant would suffice
to commit the arrestee unless the prisoner demonstrated his
innocence in his own examination.302 Thus, the Attorney
General apparently believed an ex parte warrant affidavit could
serve as a Marian witness examination for purposes of
committing an arrestee303—which suggests that was sometimes
the practice. There was no further discussion of the point, and
Marshall subsequently ruled that Wilkerson’s affidavit was
admissible in the habeas corpus proceeding, stating that
“[s]uch an affidavit seems admissible on the principle that
before the accused is put upon his trial all the proceedings are
ex parte”304—a statement that would seem to leave room for ex
parte witness examinations.
Kry correctly notes that Attorney General Rodney
conceded that General Wilkerson’s affidavit would be
inadmissible at trial, but that simply reflects the point that
Wilkerson (like the deponent in Webb) did not meet any of the
unavailability criteria. Wilkerson was not dead; he just was
not in Washington.305 Thus, neither Hening’s statement nor the

300

Id. at 124.
Id., quoted in Kry, supra note 3, at 513.
302
Id. (“The first affidavit [for the arrest warrant] would be sufficient, unless
disproved or explained by the prisoner on his examination.”).
303
I suggested that possibility, supra text accompanying note 89.
304
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 129.
305
Kry correctly notes that it was understood that General Wilkerson’s
affidavit would not have been admissible evidence at trial. Kry, supra note 3, at 513
n.81. However, he ignores the point that Wilkerson did not qualify as an unavailable
witness, which explains why his affidavit could not be admissible in a trial. I call
attention to the hypothetical discussion between Marshall and Attorney General
Rodney regarding committal proceedings in which Rodney asserted that an ex parte
arrest warrant affidavit could suffice to commit a prisoner—that is, could serve as a
Marian examination. There is no indication in Bollman that Rodney’s general
statement to that effect was challenged by anyone.
301
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colloquy in Bollman provide evidence of a cross-examination
rule in America in the aftermath of the framing.
The bottom line is that Kry has not identified any postframing American sources that reveal a framing-era in-thepresence rule, let alone a cross-examination rule. Rather, the
sources he identifies tend to show that there was a significant
lag between the publication of Radbourne, Woodcock, and
Dingler in London, and American awareness of those English
developments.
C.

Kry’s Assumption of Continuity

Mr. Kry, however, insists that it is valid to treat postframing statements as evidence of pre-framing understandings,
apparently because one can assume a high degree of
consistency in judicial rulings over time. He bases this
apparent assumption not on historical methodology, but on a
misplaced application of contract law doctrine.306 Additionally,
he notes that “Crawford’s reliance on post-framing authorities
is hardly novel,” that “Justices Scalia and Thomas also
routinely rely on post-framing English authorities” in
construing constitutional provisions,307 and that justices have
been citing cases from Leach’s Crown Cases since the late
nineteenth century.308 However, errors do not cease to be errors
simply because they are repeated.
Kry’s assumption of continuity simply conflates two
very different things: one is an interpretive posture that judges
assume when they purport to look to history to justify a
preferred result; the other is authentic legal history derived
306
Kry argues “[t]hat subsequent history is relevant to original meaning
[because s]ubsequent conduct in conformity with a particular interpretation of a
contract is evidence of the parties’ intent; no less is true of the Constitution.” Kry,
supra note 3, at 548-49. There is a significant difference between a contract ruling and
constitutional law. Contract law resorts to such fictions when there is no better way to
construe a contract and it is necessary to do so because the contract has to be construed
to settle a dispute. However, as I noted above, it is not necessary to base a
constitutional interpretation on original meaning because it is only one of a variety of
approaches to constitutional justification. Hence, when there is no direct evidence of
original meaning, originalism should not be resorted to. See supra text accompanying
note 48.
307
Kry, supra note 3, at 549-50.
308
Id. at 550-51. Kry notes that the Court cited Radbourne in Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1894). Id. at 551. However, that opinion cited
Radbourne only regarding the content of English law, not the original meaning of the
Confrontation Clause. Likewise, other Supreme Court opinions cited cases in Leach
when discussing criminal law doctrine in criminal cases, rather than constitutional
interpretation.
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from valid evidence. What legal history actually teaches is that
judges have been fudging older precedents since the beginning
of judging.309 The English legal historian Frederic Maitland put
it this way:
[The] process by which old principles and old phrases are charged
with a new content is from the lawyer’s point of view an evolution of
the true intent and meaning of the old law; from the historian’s point
of view it is almost of necessity a process of perversion and
misunderstanding.310

The reality of “perversion[s] and misunderstanding[s]” in later
interpretations of earlier doctrines cautions that authentic
legal history depends upon enforcing a strong distinction
between historical evidence and judicial revisionism. One
cannot take judicial interpretations of cases offered several
decades or more after a case was decided as evidence of the
original meaning of the earlier case; neither can one take
subsequent interpretations of a constitutional provision as
valid evidence of the original understanding of the provision.
There is too much likelihood that the post-framing treatments
will involve either deliberate or unintentional adjustments or
distortions.
Indeed, a large contradiction lurks in Kry’s account. On
the one hand, the story he tells of English Marian practices is a
story of legal “evol[ution]”311: an in-the-presence practice
“hardened into a procedural right” to be present,312 and “at
some point,” that led to a cross-examination rule.313 However,
he then tells us that we can treat nineteenth-century
commentaries and cases as evidence of eighteenth-century
understandings, apparently because we can assume constancy
of doctrinal content over time. Legal history endorses only the
evolutionary claim.
The unfounded assumption of continuity that Kry
ultimately relies upon in claiming that post-framing
statements prove framing-era understandings is a common
defect in originalist claims.
Practitioners of originalism,
including Justices Scalia and Thomas, tend to describe our
309
See supra note 26 (discussing judicial alteration of arrest law and the
transference of the law of arrest from “due process of law” in the Fifth Amendment to
the Fourth Amendment).
310
Maitland, supra note 42.
311
Kry, supra note 3, at 553 (stating that Marian practice was “evolving”).
312
Id. at 554.
313
Id. at 495.
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constitutional history as though it has been continuous and
stable, at least until recently. That is a profoundly false
picture. As I have discussed on other occasions, the past really
is a foreign country—far more foreign than originalists are
either able to see, or willing to admit.314 Indeed, once the
overall foreignness of framing-era doctrine is recognized, it is
fairly obvious that any attempt to apply a specific historical
rule to a modern issue will always involve selective originalism
at best; that is, originalists always choose to ignore far more
framing-era law than they invoke.315
For present purposes, one example of doctrinal
discontinuity is particularly pertinent. As noted above, the
other prong of Crawford’s originalist scheme limits the scope of
the confrontation right and allows the admission of unsworn
“nontestimonial” hearsay in criminal trials.316 In the course of
proposing that limitation, Justices Thomas and Scalia, as well
as commentators, have assumed that the hearsay exceptions
that now give rise to much of the current controversy over the
application of the confrontation right were commonplace at the
time of the framing.317 However, the historical sources present
a very different picture. The framing-era treatises, which
defined “hearsay” as unsworn, out-of-court statements, indicate
314
See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 419-35; Davies, Fourth Amendment,
supra note 20, at 744-50; Davies, supra note 2, at 210-17.
315
As I previously noted, the issue in Crawford, the admission of a wife’s
statement against her husband, would not have arisen in framing-era law because
there was a settled rule that a spouse’s statement could not be admitted against the
other spouse. See Davies, supra note 2, at 110 n.18. Indeed, James Wilson, one of the
early justices of the Supreme Court who was also active in the debates that preceded
the adoption of the Bill of Rights, observed in his 1790-1791 law lectures in
Philadelphia that a married couple were considered to be “but one person in the law”
and that “if they were permitted to give testimony against one another, another maxim
of the law would be violated—No one is obliged to accuse himself.” 2 THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 602 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) (reprinting Wilson’s 1790-1791
lectures). Thus, Wilson appears to have understood that the admission of the wife’s
statement at issue in Crawford would have violated the couple’s Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. However, Justice Scalia’s Crawford opinion ignored
these aspects of framing-era law when he characterized the issue in Crawford in terms
of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
See also Davies, Fourth Amendment, supra note 20, at 742-48. See also
supra notes 13, 26.
316
See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
317
See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]here appears to be little if any indication in the historical record that
the exceptions to the hearsay rule were understood to be limited by the simultaneously
evolving common-law right of confrontation.”); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 94 (1997) (“At common law, the traditional
hearsay ‘rule’ was notoriously unruly, recognizing countless exceptions to its basic
preference for live testimony.”).
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that there was a virtually complete ban against the admission
of hearsay statements as evidence of a defendant’s guilt (the
only exception being the dying declaration of a murder
victim).318 Thus, for example, the hearsay evidence involving
statements a crime victim made to a 911 operator which the
justices found to be admissible in Davis would have been
inadmissible in 1789.319
The rigorous ban against hearsay evidence regarding
the defendant’s guilt that was part of framing-era law is
obscure today because the nineteenth-century judges and
commentators who invented the variety of modern hearsay
“exceptions” that now permit admission of hearsay statements
as evidence did not call attention to the novelty of their
creations. Those judges and commentators also do not seem to
have paid much heed to the confrontation right when they
made those innovations. So much for judicial consistency over
time.
The core of Kry’s complaint against my article is that
my criticisms of Crawford’s originalist claims “rest[] critically
on [Davies’] premise that all English sources published after
1789 and all American sources published more than a few
years after 1789 are irrelevant to original meaning; relax either
of those two constraints and [Davies’] argument unravels.”320 I
do not object to that as a general summary—if one relaxes
either of those two constraints, it is unlikely one is addressing
the historical original meaning. However, I prefer to state the
318
As I document in a forthcoming article, the only two forms of out-of-court
statements that were admissible as evidence of the defendant’s guilt were dying
declarations of murder victims and the written records of Marian examinations of
witnesses who had become unavailable prior to trial. Both of these involved genuinely
unavailable witnesses and either an oath, in the instance of Marian examinations of
witnesses, or conditions that were thought to provide assurances of truthfulness
comparable to an oath, in the instance of dying declarations of murder victims. Davies,
Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 17. Compare the statement of Chief Baron Eyre in
the 1789 Woodcock case, supra note 73.
At the time of the framing, hearsay statements—that is, all unsworn outof-court statements—were not admissible as direct evidence of a defendant’s guilt but
could be admitted only for the limited purposes of either corroborating that a witness
who testified at trial had previously given the same account in out-of-court statements
(or of impeaching the trial testimony) or generally establishing the existence of a
conspiracy, but not the defendant’s personal involvement in it. See Davies, Not the
Framers’ Design, supra note 17. There were some additional exceptions that permitted
hearsay statements to be admitted with regard to certain specific issues that might
arise in civil lawsuits, but those exceptions were not recognized in criminal evidence
doctrine and also were not pertinent to criminal matters. See id.
319
See Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 17.
320
Kry, supra note 3, at 555. See also id. at 494.
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criterion directly: claims of original meaning should be based
on the legal authorities that were actually widely used by
framing-era Americans. If those sources do not clearly reveal a
settled understanding, originalist claims should not be made.
The fact that Kry has not identified significant evidence that
meets that criterion confirms that no claim regarding an
originalist Marian cross-examination rule should have been
made in Crawford.
VI.

THE UNTESTED CHARACTER OF JUDICIAL-CHAMBERS
ORIGINALISM

Although Kry has addressed only one of my two
criticisms of Crawford’s originalist claims,321 he complains that
my “fictional originalism” label is “objectionable” and also
complains about my use of Crawford as a vehicle for a broader
criticism of originalism.322 I do not shirk from the “fictional
originalism” label (which I have used before to criticize
similarly ungrounded claims of original meaning323), or from the
broader aim of my article.324 Claims that purport to reflect the
Framers’ design but are not grounded in valid historical
evidence should be regarded as fiction. Mr. Kry, like Justices
Scalia and Thomas, treats evidence that amounts to mere
traditionalism (that was the rule during the nineteenth
century) as though that suffices to support a normatively
privileged claim regarding “original meaning.” These two sorts
of claims should not be interchangeable.
A final general defect in originalism should be noted in
closing—the absence of any procedure for testing originalist
321
As noted above, Kry has not undertaken to defend the other major
“originalist” claim in Crawford, which I also criticized—the fictional claim that the
Framers would have limited the confrontation right to “testimonial” out-of-court
statements, but would not have applied it to “nontestimonial hearsay.” See supra notes
16-19 and accompanying text.
322
Kry, supra note 3, at 555.
323
See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 20 (characterizing as “fictional
originalism” Justice Souter’s claims about framing-era arrest law in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)).
324
My purpose was not to oppose the cross-examination rule as a feature of
current procedure, which I view positively, but rather to point out the fictional
character of the originalist rationale that Justice Scalia presented for it. See Davies,
supra note 2, at 106-07 (stating that the claims of original meaning in Crawford
“provide the latest installment of fictional originalism”); id. at 206-15 (“Crawford offers
a paradigmatic illustration of the defects of an originalist approach to criminal
procedure.”). For additional examples of fictional originalist claims in recent Supreme
Court criminal procedure opinions, see, for example, Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at
262-66.
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historical claims before they become enshrined in United States
Reports. The usual processes of briefing and oral argument in
the Supreme Court are not adequate. Few attorneys are
familiar enough with the historical materials to deal with them
effectively. Moreover, the page limitations on briefs are too
confined to set out historical sources, and oral argument is far
too awkward a forum.325
The typical result is judicial-chambers originalism: after
the outcome of the case has been decided in the justices’
conference, the assigned justice (assuming he or she has
originalist inclinations) and his or her law clerks root out
historical materials and create an originalist account to justify
the already-made decision, based largely on historical sources
never even mentioned in the briefs.326 The accounts produced
in this way are invariably superficial and too often simply
wrong.
The most significant feature of the controversy over the
historical evidence between Kry and me may be its timing—we
are debating the historical evidence only after Justice Scalia
announced his originalist rationale. No one had any prior
opportunity to cross-examine Crawford’s fictional originalism.

325
I have previously argued that a similar procedural deficit exists with
regard to the Supreme Court’s use of empirical research materials. See Thomas Y.
Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of
the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 611, 687-88 (1983).
326
See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 270-74, 418-19.

